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Abstract
We implement a dynamic asset pricing experiment in the spirit of Lucas (1978) with storable
assets and non-storable cash. In the ﬁrst treatment, we impose diminishing marginal returns to cash
to incentivize consumption smoothing across periods. We ﬁnd that subjects use the asset to smooth
consumption, although the asset trades at a discount relative to the risk-neutral fundamental price.
This under-pricing is a departure from the asset price “bubbles” observed in the large experimental
asset pricing literature originating with Smith et al. (1988) and can be rationalized by considering
subjects’ risk aversion with respect to uncertain money earnings. In a second treatment, with no
induced motivation for trade a` la the Smith et al. design, we ﬁnd that the asset trades at a premium
relative to its expected value and that shareholdings are highly concentrated. Elimination of asset
price uncertainty in additional experimental treatments serves to reinforce the same observations,
and suggests that speculative behavior explains the departure of prices from fundamental value in
the absence of a consumption-smoothing motive for asset trades.
Keywords: Asset Pricing, Lucas Tree Model, Experimental Economics, General Equilibrium, Intertemporal Choice,
Macroﬁnance, Consumption Smoothing.
JEL Classification Numbers: C90, D51, D91, G12.
∗Baruch College, City University of New York; sean.crockett@baruch.cuny.edu
†University of California, Irvine; duﬀy@uci.edu
‡Baruch College, City University of New York; yud@stern.nyu.edu;
§For useful comments and suggestions, we thank the editor, Dimitri Vayanos, and four anonymous referees, as well
as Elena Asparouhova, Peter Bossaerts, Craig Brown, Guillaume Frechette, John Geanakoplos, Steven Gjerstad, David
Porter, Stephen Spear and seminar participants at various conferences and universities. We thank Jonathan Lafky for
assistance with programming the experiment. Funding for this project was provided by the Dietrich School of Arts and
Sciences of the University of Pittsburgh. Crockett acknowledges funding from the National Science Foundation under
grant SES-1357895.
1 Introduction
Consumption-based general equilibrium asset pricing, pioneered by Stiglitz (1970), Lucas (1978), and
Breeden (1979), remains a workhorse model in ﬁnancial economics and macroﬁnance. This approach
relates asset prices to risk and time preferences, dividend payments, and other fundamental determi-
nants of asset values.1 While this class of theoretical models has been extensively tested using archival
ﬁeld data, the evidence to date has not been too supportive of the models’ predictions. Estimated or
calibrated versions of the standard model generally under-predict the actual premium in the return
to equities relative to bonds, the so-called “equity premium puzzle” (e.g., Hansen and Singleton 1983,
Mehra and Prescott 1985, and Kocherlakota 1996). Furthermore, the actual volatility of asset prices is
typically much greater than the model’s predicted volatility based on changes in fundamentals alone,
the so-called “excess volatility puzzle” (Shiller 1981, and LeRoy and Porter 1981).2
A diﬃculty with testing this model using ﬁeld data is that important parameters are unknown and
must be calibrated, approximated, or estimated in some fashion. An additional diﬃculty is that the
available ﬁeld data (e.g., aggregate consumption data) may be subject to measurement error (Wheatley
1988) or may not approximate well the consumption of asset market participants (Mankiw and Zeldes
1991). A typical approach is to specify a dividend process and calibrate individuals’ preferences to
this process using micro-level data. However, micro-level data may not be directly relevant to the
domain or frequency of the data examined in macroﬁnance studies.
We follow a diﬀerent path by analyzing data from a laboratory experiment with controlled income
and dividend processes, allowing for precise measurement of consumption and asset holdings. We
induce the stationarity associated with the Lucas model’s inﬁnite horizon and time discounting by
implementing an indeﬁnite horizon with a constant continuation probability. In addition, we induce
heterogeneity in consumer types to create a clear motivation for subjects to engage in trade.3 The
degree of control aﬀorded by the laboratory presents an opportunity to diagnose the causes of speciﬁc
deviations from theory, which are not identiﬁable using ﬁeld data alone.
Most previous dynamic asset pricing experiments depart in signiﬁcant ways from consumption-
based models.4 In the early literature (e.g., Forsythe et al. 1982, Plott and Sunder 1982, and Friedman
et al. 1984), cyclic type-dependent dividends are induced to motivate trade, resulting in market prices
1For surveys, see e.g., Campbell (2018), Cochrane (2005) and Lengwiler (2009).
2Nevertheless, Cochrane (Page 455, 2005) stresses that while the consumption-based model “works poorly in practice
(...) it is in some sense the only model we have. The central task of financial economics is to figure out what are the
real risks that drive asset prices and expected returns. Something like the consumption-based model–investor’s first-order
conditions for savings and portfolio choice–has to be the starting point.”
3In this respect, we deviate from the theoretical literature, which frequently presumes a representative agent and
derives equilibrium asset prices at which the equilibrium volume of trade is zero.
4Some studies test the static capital-asset pricing model (CAPM) over multiple repetitions; e.g., Bossaerts and
Plott (2002), Asparouhova et al. (2003), and Bossaerts et al. (2007).
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that eﬀectively aggregate private dividend information and converge toward rational expectations
values. While this result is in line with the eﬃcient markets view, the primary motivation for exchange
is not intertemporal consumption-smoothing as in the Lucas model.
In later, highly inﬂuential work, Smith et al. (SSW, 1988) implement a simple four-state i.i.d.
dividend process common to all subjects. A ﬁnite number of trading periods ensures that the expected
value of the asset declines over time at a constant rate. Unlike the earlier type-dependent dividend
experiments, there is no induced motive for subjects to engage in any trade in the asset. Nevertheless,
SSW observe substantial trading, with prices typically starting below the fundamental value then
rapidly soaring above for a sustained duration of time before ﬁnally collapsing near the known ﬁnal
period of the experiment. This “bubble-crash” pattern has been replicated in many studies under a
variety of treatment conditions, and has become the primary focus of a large experimental literature
on asset price formation.5 Much attention has been devoted to exploring the means by which the
frequency of bubbles can be reduced or even eliminated by using some variants of the SSW design.6,7
Experiments in the SSW tradition share the following features. Subjects are given a large, one-time
endowment (or loan) of experimental cash, called “francs.” Thereafter, an individual’s franc balance
varies with her asset purchases, sales, and earned dividends. Francs carry over from one period to
the next over the ﬁnite horizon of the market. Following the terminal period, franc balances are
converted into money earnings using a linear exchange rate. This design diﬀers from the sequence of
consumption/savings choices faced by consumers in standard inﬁnite horizon intertemporal models;
in essence, it abstracts from the consumption-smoothing rationale for trade in assets.
By contrast, subjects in our experiment receive an exogenous endowment of francs at the start
of each period, which we interpret as income, in addition to franc-denominated dividend payments
on assets held. Then, an asset market is opened, with each transaction impacting the subject’s franc
balances. Critically, after the asset market is closed, each subject’s end-of-period franc balance is
converted to dollars and stored in a private payment account from which the subject cannot withdraw
during the experiment, while her asset position carries forward to the next period with a ﬁxed and
known probability. Thus, all francs disappear from the system at the end of each period. That is, in
the language of Lucas (1978) francs are perishable “fruit” that get consumed each period, while assets
5Key papers include Porter and Smith (1995), Lei et al. (2001), Dufwenberg, et al. (2005), Haruvy and Noussair
(2006), Haruvy et al. (2007), Hussam et al. (2008), Lei and Vesely (2009), Lugovskvy et al. (2011) and Kirchler et
al. (2012). For a review of the literature, see Plott and Smith (Chapters 29-30, 2008).
6These variants include adding short sales or futures markets, computing expected values for subjects, implementing
a constant dividend, inserting “insiders” who have previously experienced bubbles, using professional traders in place of
students as subjects, framing the problem diﬀerently, or using diﬀerent price determination mechanisms
7Hommes et al. (2005, 2008) employ a diﬀerent intertemporal framework that exploited a no arbitrage condition
between risky and risk-free assets. In each period, price forecasts from subjects are elicited and leveraged to calculate
optimal individual demands for the risky asset. Equating aggregate demand with a ﬁxed supply yields prices, against
which forecasts are evaluated and compensated.
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are potentially long-lived “trees.”8
We motivate trade in our baseline (“concave”) treatment by introducing a heterogeneous, cyclic
income process and a concave franc-to-dollar exchange rate, so that the long-lived asset becomes
a vehicle to intertemporally smooth consumption. This is a critical feature of most macroﬁnance
models, which are built around the permanent income model of consumption, but it is absent from
the experimental asset pricing literature. In our alternative (“linear”) treatment, the franc-to-dollar
exchange rate is linear as in SSW-type designs; since the dividend process is common to all subjects,
there is no induced reason for subjects to trade the asset, a design that connects our macroﬁnance
economy with the laboratory asset market design of SSW. We show theoretically that if subjects are
intrinsically risk neutral with regard to uncertain money earnings, the (constant) equilibrium price
(henceforth the “fundamental price”) in both our linear and concave exchange rate treatments is the
same and is equal to the fundamental price in the analogous inﬁnite horizon economy. Importantly,
however, equilibrium consumption is characterized by perfect consumption smoothing in the concave
treatment, and is unrestricted in the linear treatment. If subjects are instead intrinsically risk averse
with regard to uncertain money earnings, we show theoretically that the equilibrium price in each
period will be strictly less than the fundamental price, that prices will converge to a steady state
equilibrium price that is weakly less than the fundamental price, and for a given distribution of risk
preferences this steady state price will be the same in both the concave and linear treatments. To
explore the role of risk aversion in our experiment, we measure subjects’ intrinsic risk attitudes using
the Holt-Laury (2002) paired lottery choice instrument.
While our experimental design mainly serves as a bridge between the experimental asset pricing
and macroﬁnance literatures, it also has some relevance for laboratory research on intertemporal
consumption-smoothing, which typically excludes tradeable assets.9 A main ﬁnding of this literature
is that subjects have diﬃculty intertemporally smoothing their consumption in the manner prescribed
by the solution to a dynamic optimization problem. By contrast, in our experimental design, in
which intertemporal consumption-smoothing is implemented by buying and selling assets at market-
determined prices, we ﬁnd strong evidence that subjects are able to smooth consumption in a manner
that is qualitatively (if not quantitatively) similar to the dynamic equilibrium solution. This ﬁnding
may also reﬂect the considerably simpler and non-stochastic income process that we use in our design.
Our main experimental ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. First, in our linear exchange
rate treatment (where there is no induced motive for trade), prices are most frequently sustained at
8Notice that francs play a dual role as “consumption good” and “medium of exchange” within a period, while assets
are the only intertemporal store of value.
9See, e.g., Hey and Dardanoni (1988), Noussair and Matheny (2000), Ballinger et al. (2003), Carbone and Hey (2004),
Carbone and Duﬀy (2014), and Meissner (2016).
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levels above the fundamental price (on average, 32% above). However, the frequency, magnitude, and
duration of such price bubbles is dramatically reduced in our concave exchange rate treatment, where
assets trade at an average discount of 24% relative to the fundamental price. The higher prices in the
linear economies are driven by a concentration of shareholdings among the most risk-tolerant subjects
in the market, identiﬁed by the Holt-Laury elicitation. By contrast, in the concave economies, most
subjects actively trade shares in each period to smooth their consumption in the manner predicted
by theory. Consequently, shareholdings are much less concentrated. Thus, market thin-ness and high
prices appear to be endogenous features of the linear treatment. We conclude that the frequency,
magnitude, and duration of asset price bubbles can be reduced by the presence of an incentive to
intertemporally smooth consumption, a key feature of most dynamic asset pricing models that is
completely absent from the SSW design used in the experimental asset pricing literature.
To better understand individual consumption and savings decisions, we conduct an additional, in-
dividual choice experiment in which subjects can buy or sell assets with the experimenter at a known,
constant price. In this experiment, the only uncertainty each subject faces is the duration of the plan-
ning horizon; their endowments and the exchange rates remain the same as in the market experiment.
We observe that the removal of price uncertainty strengthens the main ﬁndings from our market ex-
periment. Namely, individuals facing a concave exchange rate use the asset to intertemporally smooth
their consumption, while those facing a linear exchange rate adopt far more heterogeneous positions.
Further, subjects facing high prices in the linear exchange rate condition are less likely to hold large
share quantities, relative to the market experiment, suggesting that speculative motives account for
the bubbles observed in the linear market experiment.
In related, concurrent research, Asparouhova et al. (2016) implement a Lucas asset experiment in
which there are short-lived francs and two long-lived assets: trees yielding stochastic dividends and
risk-free (consol) bonds. Rather than induce consumption smoothing through a concave exchange
rate, subjects in their experiment are paid only for francs held in the terminal period of the indeﬁnite
horizon. Thus, Asparhouhova et al. rely on intrinsic subject risk aversion to smooth consumption;
i.e., a risk-averse subject should avoid holding too few francs in any period in case that period is the
terminal one. Asparouhova et al. use endogenous consumption-smoothing to investigate important
questions in ﬁnance like the equity premium puzzle and the co-variation of ﬁnancial returns with
aggregate wealth. By contrast, we focus on the comparative static impact of consumption-smoothing
when such incentives are exogenously weak or strong, bridging the gap between the consumption-
based Lucas asset pricing model and the experimental literature initiated by SSW. Like Asparouhova
et al., we ﬁnd some qualiﬁed support for the predictions of the Lucas asset pricing model, in that
price realizations are consistent with competitive equilibrium levels when there is an induced motive
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to intertemporally smooth consumption and taking into account subject’s intrinsic risk aversion.
2 The Lucas asset pricing framework
In this section, we ﬁrst describe a Lucas (1978) inﬁnite horizon economy. We then consider the indef-
inite horizon analog that we use in our experiment. Finally, we introduce the special case of constant
dividend payments, a ﬁxed aggregate endowment, and deterministic individual income, which are fea-
tures of our experimental design. For this case, we prove convergence to a steady state equilibrium
in which the price is weakly less than the fundamental price of the asset, provided weakly risk-averse
intrinsic preferences.
2.1 Infinite horizon model
Consider a Lucas (1978) pure exchange economy, comprised of a non-storable consumption good
(fruit) and an inﬁnitely-lived asset (tree). At each discrete time, t, there is a ﬁxed, ﬁnite and perfectly
divisible number of outstanding shares, K, of the asset. Each share yields an identical but potentially
time-dependent dividend, Dt, in period t. Dividends are paid in units of the consumption good at the
beginning of each period. Let Pt denote the “ex-dividend” price of a share, i.e., if the share is sold, the
sale occurs after the existing owner receives that period’s dividend Dt. Neither borrowing nor short
selling is permitted. Ownership of shares is determined each period in a competitive market. Denote
by kit the number of shares of the asset that consumer i owns at the beginning of period t, with initial
endowment ki0.
In each period the economy has a ﬁnite population, L, of consumers. Each consumer i is char-
acterized by a strictly monotonic, strictly concave, bounded, and twice continuously diﬀerentiable
instantaneous utility function Ui : R+ → R that vanishes at zero.10 That is, Ui′

cit
Ð
> 0, Ui′′

cit
Ð
< 0,
and Ui (0) = 0, where cit is the consumption of perishable goods by consumer i at time t.
In addition to the dividend payment, each consumer receives an exogenous endowment of the
consumption good, denoted yit, at the beginning of each period t. This endowment may vary from
period to period and may be diﬀerent across consumers. Thus, the total resources available to each
consumer in a given period are the exogenous endowment, plus the sum of dividends, plus (minus)
the sale (purchase) value of assets shares. Formally,
yit +Dtk
i
t + Ptk
i
t| {z }
Resources
= cit +Ptk
i
t+1| {z }
Usage
, (1)
which implies that
kit+1 =
Å
1 +
Dt
Pt
ã
kit +
1
Pt
Ä
yit − cit
ä
. (2)
10
R+ stands for the set of nonnegative real numbers, i.e., R+ = {x | x ≥ 0, x ∈ R}.
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Equation (1) also implies the market clearing conditions
K =
X
i
kit and Ct =
X
i
cit, (3)
for every t. Since endowment and dividends cannot be stored and the utility function is strictly
monotonic, these resources are completely consumed in each period. That is,
Ct = Yt +DtK, (4)
where Yt =
X
i
yit is the aggregate endowment in the economy at time t.
Each consumer, i, faces the following objective function,
vi

mi0
Ð
= max
{cit}∞t=0
E
i
0
" ∞X
t=0
βtUi
Ä
cit
ä#
(5)
s.t. kit+1 =
Å
1 +
Dt
Pt
ã
kit +
1
Pt
Ä
yit − cit
ä
mit+1 = (Pt+1 +Dt+1) k
i
t+1
where, to rule out non-fundamental solutions, the transversality condition
lim
τ→∞E
i
t
î
βτUi
′ Ä
cit+τ
ä
(Pt+τ +Dt+τ ) kit+τ
ó
= 0 is assumed to hold.11 The coeﬃcient β ∈ (0, 1) is the
(common) period discount factor, and Eit [·] stands for the expectation conditional upon the information
set (beliefs) available to consumer i at time t. The variable mit+1 denotes the value of resources
consumer i chooses to transfer to time t + 1 via the shareholdings that she adopts at time t. By the
strict monotonicity of Ui, the budget constraint of each consumer i is binding in equilibrium. That is,
cit = y
i
t + (Pt +Dt) k
i
t − Ptkit+1. (6)
Since neither borrowing nor short selling are permitted, we must have that cit ≥ 0 and kit ≥ 0. Hence,
when the solution to the maximization problem in Equation (5) implies cit < 0 or kit < 0, a boundary
solution is obtained since utility functions are strictly monotonic. The same holds when the solution
implies that kit > K. Henceforth, we focus on characterizing the unique interior equilibrium solution.
The consumer’s maximization problem in Equation (5) can be rewritten in the form of Bellman’s
(recursive) equation
vi
Ä
mit
ä
= max
{cit}
Ui
Ä
cit
ä
+ βEit
î
vi
Ä
mit+1
äó
, (7)
with the transversality condition lim
τ→∞β
τ
E
i
t
î
vi′

mit+τ
Ð
mit+τ
ó
= 0. Suppose the value function, vi, is
diﬀerentiable. The ﬁrst order condition (FOC) for an interior solution at each time t = 1, 2, 3 . . . is
0 = Ui
′ Ä
cit
ä
− βEit
ï
vi
′ Ä
mit+1
ä Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt
ò
, (8)
11When Ui is linear, the transversality condition need not hold; in that case, non-fundamental bubble solutions are
possible.
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for every consumer i. By the Envelope Theorem (e.g., Milgrom and Segal (2002)),
vi′
Ä
mit+1
ä
= Ui′
Ä
cit+1
ä
. (9)
Thus, the FOC in Equation (8) becomes
P∗t = βE
i
t
"
Ui′

cit+1
Ð
Ui ′

cit
Ð (Pt+1 +Dt+1)
#
, (10)
which, by applying the law of iterated expectations, can be rewritten as
P∗t = E
i
t
" ∞X
τ=1
βτ
Ui′

cit+τ
Ð
Ui′

cit
Ð Dt+τ
#
. (11)
The term β
Ui
′(cit+τ )
Ui
′(cit)
is referred to as the stochastic discount factor, and the term
Ui
′(cit+τ )
Ui
′(cit)
is referred
to as the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution.
Equation (11) does not assume a particular form for the utility function Ui, and must hold for
any equilibrium price function.12 When all consumers have the same utility function and beliefs,
Equation (11) holds for such a “representative” consumer.13 Because the utility function is strictly
monotonic, markets clear. Finally, by Lucas (Proposition 1, 1978), the pairs v (mt) and P∗t , which are
the solution to the maximization problem in Equation (5), deﬁne a unique equilibrium.
2.2 Indefinite horizon model with induced preferences
Since we cannot study an inﬁnite number of periods in the laboratory, we move to a related indeﬁnite
horizon setting, where the economy continues to the next period with a known, constant probability,
π. The economy remains comprised of perishable “fruit” and a ﬁxed number of asset shares in a
potentially long-lived “tree.” Fruit (endowment income, dividends, and net income from the sale
of shares) is denominated in an experimental currency called “francs.” Consumption involves the
conversion of these franc balances into real money earnings (“dollars”) using the exchange function
ui : R+ → R+ at the end of each period. This exchange function is strictly monotonic, strictly concave,
bounded, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and vanishes at zero.14
The exchange function is applied to control a consumer’s objective function and provide incen-
tives to consume. A concave ui induces a diminishing marginal utility of consumption and motivates
consumption smoothing through trade in the asset market. Thus, henceforth, we refer to ui as an
“induced utility” function and to the concavity of ui as “induced risk aversion.” By contrast, we will
12Recall that, in equilibrium, the price of assets must be such that each consumer does not want to modify her asset
holdings at any time t.
13A` la Constantinides (1982), a representative investor can be deﬁned as an artiﬁcial investor whose tastes and beliefs
are such that if all investors in the economy had tastes and beliefs identical to his, the equilibrium in the economy
remains unchanged. When consumers have heterogeneous beliefs or utility functions, the existence of a representative
investor requires either the market be complete (Dybvig and Ingersoll, 1982), or consumers have homogeneous beliefs
and time-additive utility functions (Constantinides, 1980).
14That is, ui
′
(·) > 0, ui′′ (·) < 0 and ui (0) = 0.
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henceforth refer to Ui as the unobserved “intrinsic” (or homegrown) utility function of consumer i.
Later, we show that the function ui eﬀectively plays a role similar to Ui in Equation (11) when con-
sumers are intrinsically risk neutral, but we will also consider cases where consumers are intrinsically
risk averse.
In each period t, consumer i chooses a quantity, sit, of francs to convert (save) into dollars, cit =
ui

sit
Ð
, which is added to her accumulated consumption quantity (experimental earnings) ζit =
tX
τ=0
ciτ .
These consumption earnings are not available to use during the experiment (dollars accrue in a virtual
lock box); at the end of the experiment a subject’s cumulative balance is paid in cash. At the end of
each period a lottery determines whether the economy continues to the next period with probability
π or ends with probability 1− π. If the economy ends, then all asset shares vanish and consumption
of the accumulated dollars takes place.15 If the economy continues, then shareholdings carry over to
the next period.
In this indeﬁnite horizon economy, each consumer i faces the maximization problem
vi

mi0
Ð
= max
{sit}∞t=0
E
i
0
" ∞X
t=0
(1− π)πtβtUi
Ä
ζit
ä#
(12)
s.t. kit+1 =
Å
1 +
Dt
Pt
ã
kit +
1
Pt
Ä
yit − sit
ä
mit+1 = (Pt+1 +Dt+1) k
i
t+1
ζit =
tX
τ=0
ciτ
cit = u
i
Ä
yit +Dtk
i
t + Pt
Ä
kit − kit+1
ää
,
where the transversality condition lim
τ→∞E
i
t
î
(1− π)πτβτUi′
Ä
ζit+τ
ä
ui
′ Ä
sit+τ
ä
(Pt+τ + Dt+τ ) kit+τ
ó
= 0 is
assumed to hold.16 The ﬁrst constraint can be rewritten to deﬁne the quantity of francs that consumer
i converts into dollars (saves) at time t,
sit = y
i
t +Dtk
i
t +Pt
Ä
kit − kit+1
ä
. (13)
Since both ui and Ui are strictly monotonic, this budget constraint is always binding.
The maximization problem in Equation (12) can be rephrased in the form of the Bellman’s (re-
cursive) equation
vi
Ä
mit
ä
= max
{sit}
(1− π)Ui
Ä
ζit
ä
+ πβEit
î
vi
Ä
mit+1
äó
(14)
with the transversality condition lim
τ→∞ (1− π)π
τβτEit
î
vi′

mit+τ
Ð
mit+τ
ó
= 0. The FOC of an interior
15In the experiment, subjects participate in several such indeﬁnite horizon economies (which we call sequences). Thus,
they are only paid their accumulated earnings following the last of these sequences.
16In the case where both Ui and ui are linear–a possibility we allow for in our experiment–the transversality condition
need not hold. However, even in that case, since the total resources of our experimental economy are held ﬁxed, the
transversality condition must nevertheless hold.
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solution of this problem is then
0 = (1− π)Ui′
Ä
ζit
ä
ui
′ Ä
sit
ä
− πβEit
ï
vi
′ Ä
mit+1
ä Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt
ò
. (15)
By Lemma 1 (see Appendix),
vi
′ Ä
mit+1
ä
= (1− π)Ui′
Ä
ζit+1
ä
ui
′ Ä
sit+1
ä
. (16)
Thus, for every time t, the equilibrium price satisﬁes
P∗t = πβE
i
t
"
Ui′

ζit+1
Ð
Ui′

ζit
Ð ui
′ 
sit+1
Ð
ui′

sit
Ð (Pt+1 +Dt+1)
#
, (17)
for all i, and, by the law of iterated expectations, can be rewritten as
P∗t = E
i
t
" ∞X
τ=1
πτβτ
Ui′

ζit+τ
Ð
Ui′

ζit
Ð ui
′ 
sit+τ
Ð
ui′

sit
Ð Dt+τ
#
. (18)
Notice that when all consumers are intrinsically risk neutral (i.e., when Ui is linear), and the length
of a sequence is suﬃciently short so that there is no impatience (i.e., β = 1), then Equation (18)
simpliﬁes to Equation (11) provided that: (i) The continuation probability, π, equals the (constant)
discount factor in the inﬁnite horizon model, and (ii) The induced utility function, ui, in the indeﬁnite
horizon model matches the intrinsic period utility function, Ui, in the inﬁnite horizon model of the last
subsection. Thus, we may treat our indeﬁnite horizon model as an induced preference implementation
of the inﬁnite horizon model of Subsection 2.1 under the assumption that consumers are intrinsically
risk neutral with respect to the uncertain amounts of money they earn in our experiment.17
2.3 The model implemented in the laboratory
To implement the model described in the previous section in the laboratory, we make four additional
assumptions. First, the dividend in every time period, t, is constant, Dt = D.18 Second, the endow-
ment, yit, that each consumer i receives is deterministic. Third, the aggregate endowment of income
is constant over time, and this is common knowledge. Fourth, we assume that β = 1; since consumers
cannot spend cumulative dollar earnings until the end of the experiment and savings do not earn
any interest, there is no reason to treat dollars earned in diﬀerent periods diﬀerently. The ﬁrst three
assumptions, along with the assumption we maintain throughout that aggregate shares are constant
over time, imply that aggregate resources available for saving St =
X
i
sit are held constant over time,
so that St = S for all t. Summarizing these assumptions, we have
17This distinction between induced and intrinsic risk aversion will prove useful later on in explaining our experimental
ﬁndings and that is why we introduce it here.
18When the dividend is stochastic and consumers are strictly risk averse, it is straightforward to show that a steady
state equilibrium price does not exist. Instead, the price will depend (at a minimum) upon the current realization of
the dividend, which aﬀects current consumption and accordingly the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. Mehra
and Prescott (1985) derive equilibrium pricing in a representative agent version of the inﬁnite horizon model with a
ﬁnite-state Markov dividend process.
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Assumption 1. Aggregate income and shares in the economy are constant, dividends are constant,
individual endowment income is deterministic, and there is no time discounting.
Under these design-motivated assumptions, any rational expectations equilibrium sequence of
prices and allocations through period t is deterministic, conditional on reaching period t. We can
thus discard the expectation operator, Eit [·], in Equations (17) and (18); the only uncertainty is
horizon uncertainty, i.e., whether period t + τ will be reached.
When the intrinsic utility function of all consumers is linear (i.e., consumers are intrinsically risk
neutral), we next show the price in each period is equal to the fundamental price.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and the intrinsic utility, Ui, is linear for each
consumer i. Then, the price in each period is constant and equal to the fundamental price
P∗t =
πD
1− π ≡ P
∗
. (19)
Further, if the induced utility, ui, is strictly concave for each consumer i, then equilibrium savings
satisﬁes
sit = s
i
t+1 ≡ si∗, (20)
for every time t and every consumer i. If instead ui is linear, equilibrium savings are restricted only
by the budget constraint.
The proof of Proposition 1 and all subsequent Propositions can be found in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that when Ui is linear for every consumer i, the equilibrium price is
equal to the expected value of the dividend stream and is independent of the induced utility function,
ui. Our experimental design exploits this independence result. Under the assumption that consumers
are intrinsically risk neutral, we can vary the induced utility function and not alter the equilibrium
price prediction. Indeed, as we discuss later in Section 3, our experiment compares and contrasts the
case where the induced utility function is linear, as in the SSW experimental approach, with the case
where the induced utility function is strictly concave, introducing a consumption-smoothing incentive
for exchange which is the core feature of the Lucas model. Thus, our experimental design enables us
to make a connection between the SSW design and the Lucas asset pricing model.
We next prove that if each consumer i is intrinsically risk averse, i.e., her intrinsic utility Ui is
strictly concave, and if each consumer’s induced utility function ui is weakly concave, the equilibrium
price in every period is strictly less than the fundamental price given by Equation (19). In this case,
the certainty equivalent of the dividend stream ﬂowing from the asset is less than its expected value
for intrinsically risk-averse consumers.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, the intrinsic utility, Ui, is strictly concave, and
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the induced utility, ui, is weakly concave. Then, the equilibrium price at time t satisﬁes
P∗t < P
∗
. (21)
We next focus on a wide class of possible speciﬁcations for the intrinsic utility function, Ui;
speciﬁcally, constant absolute risk aversion(CARA) and decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA).
For these speciﬁcations, we seek to identify comparative static implications from whether the induced
utility function, ui, is concave or linear. Speciﬁcally, we show that prices necessarily converge to a
steady state equilibrium price, in the limit as t approaches inﬁnity, independent of the induced utility
function. Thus, the connection between the SSW experimental asset pricing framework and the Lucas
asset pricing model extends to intrinsically risk-averse consumers; we are able to vary an induced
incentive to smooth consumption while keeping the underlying steady state fundamentals unchanged.
We begin with the assumption that the intrinsic utility function, Ui, exhibits CARA, in which
case accumulated wealth does not aﬀect the consumer’s current portfolio choice.19 The CARA utility
function can be speciﬁed as:
Ui
Ä
ζit
ä
=
1− e−γiζit
γi
. (22)
Each consumer i’s intrinsic risk aversion is summarized by a parameter γi > 0, where risk aversion is
increasing in γi.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and each consumer i is strictly risk averse with
CARA intrinsic utility, Ui. When the induced utility function, ui, is weakly concave for every consumer
i,
lim
t→∞P
∗
t =
πD
eγ
ici∗ − π ≡
bP∗ < P∗, (23)
where ci∗ = lim
t→∞ c
i
t, for each consumer i. Further, when u
i is linear for every consumer i, the constant
price and consumption speciﬁed in Equation (23) characterize a unique equilibrium at every time t > 1.
This proposition implies that, when all intrinsic utility functions are strictly CARA, the economy
converges to a unique steady state equilibrium in which the price, bP∗, and consumption, ci∗ (and thus
savings, si∗), of every consumer are constant over time. The steady state price is strictly less than the
fundamental price and is implemented in the second and all subsequent periods if the induced utility
function is linear.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, each consumer i is strictly risk averse with CARA
intrinsic utility, Ui, and the induced utility function, ui, is weakly concave for each i. Then, in a
steady state equilibrium, consumer i’s savings, si∗, is strictly decreasing in the risk aversion parameter
γi. Further, the steady state equilibrium price is decreasing in γi.
19Indeed, Sherstyuk et al. (2013) ﬁnd no evidence of wealth eﬀects for cumulative payment procedures such as the
one we implement, which suggests that CARA may be a reasonable approximation for Ui.
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Suppose now that all consumers have intrinsic DARA utility. That is, the consumers’ risk aversion
decreases as wealth increases. In this case, the equilibrium price sequence converges to the fundamental
price from below, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 4. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, each consumer i is strictly risk averse with DARA
intrinsic utility, Ui, and the induced utility, ui, is weakly concave for each i. Then, as time t tends
to inﬁnity, the economy converges to the fundamental price P∗. Further, when ui is strictly concave,
there exists a unique limiting saving allocation si∗ for every consumer i, while if instead ui is linear,
equilibrium savings are restricted only by the budget constraint.
The recursive Equation (17) is typically under-determined. Yet, it is instructive to consider an
example with an analytical solution. For that purpose, we assume that both the induced utility
function, u, and the intrinsic utility function, U, exhibit homogeneous constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA).20 The CRRA utility function is speciﬁed by
U
Ä
Cit
ä
=
8>><
>>:
(ζit)
1−γ
1−γ , if γ = 1;
ln

ζit
Ð
if γ = 1.
Proposition 5. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, the intrinsic utility, Ui, for each consumer i is
CRRA with risk aversion parameter γ > 0, and the induced utility, ui, for each consumer i is CRRA
with curvature parameter δ ≥ 0. In addition, suppose there are an equal number of two types of
consumers, who diﬀer only in their endowments. Then the equilibrium price in period t is
P∗t = D
∞X
τ=t
πτ−t+1
Å
τ
τ + 1
ãγ
(24)
Further, each consumer’s consumption is constant across all periods.
This proposition implies that, when the intrinsic utility function is homogeneous and CRRA, each
consumer perfectly smoothes her consumption over time. Further, neither the equilibrium price nor
the savings allocation depends on the induced utility function. The equilibrium price sequence is
monotonically increasing over time and converges to the fundamental price from below (consistent
with Propositions 2 and 4) in the limit as t approaches inﬁnity.
In summary, when consumers are intrinsically risk neutral, the equilibrium price in each period is
equal to the fundamental price. When consumers are intrinsically risk averse, the equilibrium price in
each period is strictly less than the fundamental price, and converges to a unique steady state equilib-
rium price and savings allocation. Concerning DARA intrinsic utility, the emergent price is equal to
the fundamental price. Concerning CARA intrinsic utility, the emergent price is strictly less than the
fundamental price. Concerning homogeneous CRRA utility, the equilibrium price can be characterized
20CRRA is a special case of DARA, which we use for our induced utility function in the experiment.
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analytically for each period t, is strictly increasing over time, converges to the fundamental price (since
CRRA utility is within the DARA class of utility functions), and does not depend on induced utility
u.
2.4 Hypotheses
Based on the theory developed in Section 2.3, we present the following hypotheses, which we test in
our experiment:
Hypothesis 1. Prices in both the linear and concave induced utility treatments are weakly less than
the fundamental price, P∗.
An alternative hypothesis, inconsistent with the theoretical results of Section 2.3 but consistent
with the large literature on asset price “bubbles” beginning with SSW, is the following:
Hypothesis 2. Prices in the linear induced utility treatment exceed the fundamental price P∗, while
prices in the concave induced utility treatment are weakly less than P∗.
This alternative hypothesis can be motivated by belief heterogeneity. Consumer i’s subjective
beliefs, as reﬂected in the probabilities used to assess Eit [·], impact the equilibrium price and allocation
described by Equation (17). Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Hong et al. (2006) explore how
heterogeneous beliefs about realized dividends can generate equilibrium prices exceeding an asset’s
fundamental value. An overconﬁdent or optimistic buyer may consume less to buy more assets, to
the point of holding the entire asset supply. While dividends are ﬁxed in our experiment, optimism
or overconﬁdence with respect to expected future prices may play a related role out of equilibrium.
Alternatively, it is possible for consumers to subjectively and diﬀerently weight the continuation
probability, π, (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which may also impact prices. Finally, there is
the possibility that risk-seeking behavior drives prices above fundamentals.
We do not attempt to model these “bubble mechanisms.” However, there are good reasons to think
that heterogeneous beliefs may disproportionately impact choices when the induced utility function
is linear as opposed to when it is concave, which are the two main treatments of our experiment (as
described in the next section). Suppose that a subject’s induced and intrinsic utility functions are
both linear, and the subject holds the (rigid) belief in period t that Pt+1 > Pt > P∗. If this subject
buys at date t and sells at date t+1, his expected gain is π(Pt+1+D)−Pt per share. If this expected
gain is positive, the subject would want to buy as many shares as possible in period t, and may choose
to sell shares in the next period at Pt+1 to other subjects who believe that prices will continue to
appreciate beyond that period. Of course, given ﬁxed franc resources, such bubbly expectations cannot
be sustained indeﬁnitely, but there can be a fairly long sequence of positive expected value draws, one
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of which will result in termination with high probability.21 Alternatively, a subject with these same
beliefs pursuing the same speculative strategy would, under a concave induced utility function, be
heavily penalized for the high variance in his period-by-period consumption levels that resulted from
such speculation. Thus, the logic for Hypothesis 2 is that under a linear induced utility function we
are more likely to see bubbly prices arising from heterogeneous beliefs while under a concave induced
utility function, the individual’s need to smooth consumption should dampen the extent of mispricing
of the asset, so that prices should be more in line with our theoretical predictions.
When the induced utility function ui is concave, consumers perfectly smooth their consumption
provided that their intrinsic utility function is linear (risk neural) or in the DARA steady state
equilibrium, while consumption is unrestricted for induced linear utility. However, in Proposition 5 we
show that for intrinsically risk averse consumers there exist economies in which consumers perfectly
smooth their consumption regardless of whether ui is concave or linear. Consideration of these results
leads us to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. When the induced utility, ui, is concave, subjects use the asset to intertemporally
smooth their consumption to the same or to a greater extent than when ui is linear.
In addition, we consider two further hypotheses that follow from the previous section:
Hypothesis 4. For a given induced utility function ui, prices are higher in sessions with a higher
dividend payment D.
Hypothesis 5. For a given induced utility function ui and dividend, prices are lower in sessions with
higher degrees of risk aversion as measured by Holt-Laury scores.
3 Experimental design
We seek to determine the extent to which the price and shareholding predictions of the Lucas asset
pricing model are supported in a laboratory experiment. Valuing shares in our indeﬁnite horizon
implementation is more complicated than in SSW, and in fact no participant possesses suﬃcient
information to calculate the equilibrium price. Therefore, we assess the extent to which observed prices
can be rationalized by knowledge of fundamentals alone, namely the asset’s dividend, the continuation
probability, the subject’s induced utility function, and the subject’s income process. Our experiment
was designed with the intent of testing Hypotheses 1-5, as presented in the previous section.
21This scenario shares some features with the centipede game, in which backward induction and ﬁnite resources should
induce “fundamental” behavior, yet experimental evidence (e.g., McKelvey and Palfrey, 1992) conﬁrms a lack of backward
induction reasoning relative to the complete information Nash equilibrium. It also shares some features of the “winner’s
curse,” wherein the subject who believes the bubble will last the longest gets stuck holding the asset during the crash.
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3.1 Income, dividends, and induced utility
We focus on two variations in model parameters. First, we examine whether changes in the value of
the ﬁxed dividend payment, D, aﬀect the price of the asset, as theory asserts that a larger dividend
payment—a fundamental factor—induces a higher steady state equilibrium price. Changing the div-
idend payment provides a simple test of a comparative statics prediction of the theory, as stated in
Hypothesis 4.22 Second, we examine whether the strength of the consumption-smoothing objective
matters, by varying the curvature of the subjects’ induced utility functions, ui, over consumption.
This latter treatment variation is novel to our design, and enables us to connect and diﬀerentiate our
Lucas asset pricing model ﬁndings with results from SSW-inspired experiments. Changes in ui are
used to address Hypotheses 1-3.
We use a 2× 2 design where the treatment variables are: 1) the induced utility function ui, which
is either strictly concave as in the Lucas model (page 1431, 1978) or linear as in SSW’s approach;
and 2) the dividend, D, which is either high or low. We conduct twenty laboratory sessions (ﬁve per
treatment) of the indeﬁnite horizon economy introduced in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. In each session, there
are twelve subjects, six of each induced utility type, for a total of 240 subjects. The endowments and
induced utility functions of the two subject types in all treatments are given in Table 1.
i # Subjects ki0 {yit} ui(sit)
1 6 1
110 if t is odd
δ1 + α1s
η1
t
44 if t is even
2 6 4
24 if t is odd
δ2 + α2s
η2
t
90 if t is even
Table 1: Induced Utility and Endowment Parameters
In each session, the franc endowment, yit, for each type i ∈ {1, 2} follows the same deterministic
two-cycle. Subjects are informed that the aggregate endowment of income and shares will remain
constant throughout the session, but otherwise are only privy to information regarding their own
income, shareholdings, and induced utility function. In each session, dividends take a constant value
of either D = 2 or D = 3, and the induced utility function ui is either linear or concave for both subject
types. Thus, our four treatments are C2 (concave induced utility, D = 2), C3 (concave induced utility,
D = 3), L2 (linear induced utility, D = 2), and L3 (linear induced utility, D = 3). We adopt a constant
dividend framework since our primary motivation is to induce an economic incentive for trade in a
standard macroﬁnance setting. Porter and Smith (1995) show that implementing constant dividends
in the SSW design does not substantially reduce the incidence or magnitude of asset price bubbles.
22Alternatively, we could have changed other fundamental factors, such as the continuation probability, π. We chose to
vary the dividend, as changes in the dividend process is a common treatment variation in the experimental asset pricing
literature.
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The induced utility parameters are chosen so that subjects earn $1 per period at the (intrinsic)
risk neutral competitive equilibrium in C2 and L2. By contrast, C2 subjects can earn, on average,
$0.45 per period in autarky (no trade). In L2, expected earnings in autarky equal the competitive
equilibrium earnings due to the linear exchange rate. A higher dividend results in modestly higher
benchmark payments. In L3 and C3, subjects earn on average $1.06 per period in the risk neutral
competitive equilibrium, while the autarkic payoﬀ in C3 is on average $0.58 per period. This doubling
of payoﬀs between competitive equilibrium and autarky is chosen to make the diﬀerences salient to
subjects, in line with prior research (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000). The induced utility function used
in each treatment is presented to the subjects both as a table and a graph (see Online Appendix).
In our baseline treatments C2 and C3, we set ηi < 1 and αiηi > 0.23 Given our cyclic income
process, Equation (17) and the budget constraint can be used to show that risk neutral or DARA
steady-state shareholdings follow a two-cycle between the initial share endowment, kiEven[t] = k
i
0, and
kiOdd[t] = k
i
Even[t] +
yiOdd[t] − yiEven[t]
2P∗ +D
. (25)
Notably, in the steady state, subjects smooth consumption by buying asset shares during high income
periods and selling shares during low income periods. When D = 2 by Equation (19), the fundamental
price is P∗ = 10. In turn, Equation (25) implies that, at the fundamental price equilibrium, a type
1 subject in our C2 treatment holds 1 share in odd periods and 4 shares in even periods, and a type
2 subject holds 4 shares in odd periods and 1 share in even periods. When D = 3, the fundamental
price is P∗ = 15, and in equilibrium, a type 1 subject in our C3 treatment cycles between 1 and 3
shares, while a type 2 subject cycles between 4 and 2 shares.
Our primary variation on the baseline concave treatments is to set ηi = 1 for both agent types so
that there is no longer an incentive to smooth consumption.24 The linear treatments aim to examine
an environment that is closer to the SSW framework. In SSW’s design, the dividend process is common
to all subjects and dollar payoﬀs are linear in francs, so intrinsic risk-neutral subjects have no induced
motivation to engage in trade. Under (alternative) Hypothesis 2, in L2 and L3 assets will trade at
prices greater than the fundamental price, P∗, in line with SSW’s bubble ﬁndings. This, however,
contradicts our theoretical prediction (Hypothesis 1) that the curvature of induced utility has no
impact on the steady state equilibrium price for subjects regardless of their induced utility treatment.
As is standard in asset market experiments, neither borrowing nor short selling is permitted; i.e.,
sit ≥ 0 and kit ≥ 0. In particular, we impose the following trading constraints:
yit + Dtk
i
t +Pt
Ä
kit − kit+1
ä
≥ 0, and kit ≥ 0.
23Speciﬁcally, η1 = −1.195, α1 = −311.34, δ1 = 2.6074, and η2 = −1.3888, α2 = −327.81, δ2 = 2.0627.
24In these linear induced utility treatments, α1 = 0.0122, α2 = 0.0161, and δ1 = δ2 = 0.
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The experiment is designed in such a way that these restrictions only bind out of equilibrium.
3.2 The continuation probability π
As noted earlier, we seek to induce the stationarity associated with an inﬁnite horizon and constant
time discounting by implementing an indeﬁnite horizon with a stochastic number of trading periods.25
Thus, from a subject’s perspective, a share of the asset today is worth more than a share tomorrow
not because she is impatient, but because the asset may cease to have value in the next period. In each
period, trade takes place for three minutes in a centralized marketplace. At the end of each period,
one subject in rotation takes a turn rolling a six-sided die in public view of the other participants. If
the die roll in period t is between 1 and 5 inclusive, the economy continues for another period. In this
case, each individual’s asset position is carried over to the start of period t + 1. If the die roll is 6,
the economy terminates and all subjects’ asset positions are declared worthless. Thus, the probability
that assets continue to have value in future trading periods is π = 5/6.
Subjects are recruited for a three-hour session, during which they participate in several “sequences,”
each consisting of an indeﬁnite number of three-minute “trading periods.” Each sequence of trading
periods ends upon a die roll of 6. We choose to have subjects participate in several indeﬁnite sequences
to better familiarize them with the role played by the continuation probability π. We instruct subjects
that after one hour of play (following the reading of the instructions) the current sequence being played
will be the ﬁnal one; i.e., the next time a 6 is rolled the session will come to a close. This design
ensures a reasonable number of trading periods, while at the same time limits the possibility that
sessions last longer than the 3-hour recruitment window. Indeed, we never failed to complete the ﬁnal
sequence within the three hour time window for each session.26 The expected mean (median) number
of trading periods per sequence in this design is 6 (4), respectively. The realized mean (median) is 5.2
(4) in our sessions. On average there are 3.4 sequences per session.
Given π and our adopted values of D, the fundamental price of the asset in treatments C2 and
L2 is 10, while the fundamental price of the asset in treatments C3 and L3 is 15. When subjects are
intrinsically risk neutral, Proposition 1 implies that the price across all treatments should equal the
fundamental price. When all subjects exhibit intrinsic CARA utility, Proposition 3 implies that prices
should converge to a value less than 10 in C2 and L2, and to a value less than 15 in C3 and L3. When
25We follow the dynamic asset pricing experiment of Camerer and Weigelt (1993) in this regard. This technique for
implementing inﬁnite horizon environments in a laboratory setting is quite standard in game theory experiments (e.g.,
Bo´ and Fre´echette, 2011 and has a rich history, beginning with Roth and Murnighan (1978).
26In the instructions, subjects are informed that if the ﬁnal sequence is not completed within one hour, they would be
invited back to the lab as quickly as mutually possible to complete the ﬁnal sequence. In this event, subjects would be
paid immediately for the previous (completed) sequences, but would be paid for the entirety of the ﬁnal sequence at the
conclusion of the follow-up session. Their ﬁnancial stake in that ﬁnal sequence is derived from at least 20 periods of play
(trading periods are three minutes long), which made the event an unlikely (

5
6
Ð20 ≈ 2.6%) but compelling motivator to
get subjects back to the lab. As it turns out, we did not have to bring subjects back for any continuation session.
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all subjects exhibit intrinsic DARA utility, Proposition 4 implies that prices should converge to the
fundamental price in all treatments. To get some sense of the expected speed of convergence, consider
homogeneous intrinsic logarithmic utility (the limiting utility as the CRRA preference parameter tends
to 1) and homogeneous CRRA induced utility parameter 2.3 (approximately the value used in the
experiment).27 Then the price equation in Proposition 5 implies an equilibrium price equal to 77% of
the fundamental price in the ﬁrst period and 96% of the fundamental price by period 18 (the mean
session length in our experiment). So it is not implausible to expect convergence to the fundamental
price by the end of the experiment.
3.3 The trading mechanism
General equilibrium models do not specify the actual mechanism by which prices are determined and
assets are exchanged. We adopt the double auction mechanism for trade, since it is well known to
reliably converge to competitive equilibrium in a wide range of experimental markets. To this end, we
use the double auction module in Fischbacher’s (2007) z-Tree software.
Prior to the start of each three-minute trading period t, each subject i is informed of her current
asset position, kit, and the number of francs she has available for trade, y
i
t + Dk
i
t. After all subjects
click a button conﬁrming they understand their asset and franc allocations, trading begins. Subjects
can post buy or sell orders for one unit of the asset at a time. They can sell as many assets as they
have available, or buy as many assets as they wish, provided they maintain a balance of at least 11
francs.28 We institute a standard bid-ask improvement rule: buy oﬀers have to improve on (exceed)
existing buy oﬀers and sell oﬀers have to improve on (undercut) existing sell oﬀers to be posted in the
(open) limit order book. Subjects can agree to buy or sell at a currently posted price (i.e., submit a
market order) by clicking on the Bid/Ask, immediately after which the transaction is executed and the
price publicly posted. After a trade, the order book is cleared, but subjects can (and do) immediately
begin reposting buy and sell orders. A history of transaction prices and trading volume is always
present on subjects’ screens. In addition to this information, each subject’s franc and asset balances
are adjusted in real time in response to any transactions.
3.4 Subjects, payments and timing
Subjects are undergraduate students from the University of Pittsburgh, 18 years of age or older.
Subjects could participate in no more than one session of our experiment. There are no other exclusions
27For one subject endowment type we induce a value of about 2.2 and for the other type we induce a value of about
2.4
28A minimum positive franc balance is implemented because the induced utility of zero francs in the concave treatments
is minus inﬁnity. The payoﬀ associated with 11 francs in the concave treatments is −$9.67 (−$15.13) for type 1 (2)
subjects. Only 2 out of 120 subjects reached this boundary (once each) in the concave treatments, the boundary was
reached 31 times (out of more than 2,000 subject-periods) in the linear treatments.
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on subject participation. At the beginning of each session, 12 subjects are randomly assigned a role
as either a type 1 or type 2 agent, with 6 subjects of each type. Subjects remain in the same role
for the duration of the session. They are seated at visually isolated computer workstations and are
given written instructions that are also read aloud prior to the start of play in an eﬀort to make the
instructions public knowledge. As part of the instructions, each subject is required to complete two
quizzes to test comprehension of the induced utility function, the asset market trading rules and other
features of the environment. The session does not proceed until all subjects have answered these quiz
questions correctly. Instructions (including quizzes, payoﬀ tables, charts and endowment sheets) are
reproduced in the Online Appendix. 29 Subjects are recruited for a three hour session, but a typical
market ends after a little more than two hours, including instructions (instructions take about 35
minutes). An additional 15 minutes is devoted to the Holt-Laury elicitation task, which is conducted
at the end of each session and not announced in advance.
Payoﬀs are earned from every period of every sequence in the session. Mean (median) payoﬀs are
$22.65 ($22.41) per subject in the linear sessions and $18.75 ($19.48) in the concave sessions, including
a $5 show-up payment but excluding the payment for the Holt-Laury individual choice experiment.30
Mean payments are higher in the linear sessions because the sum of individual subject payments
are constant across periods. Whereas social welfare is uniquely optimized at the fundamental price
equilibrium in the concave sessions.
Following the end of each trading period, t, subject i’s franc balance, sit, is determined for that
period. The dollar amount of this franc-consumption holding, ui(sit), accrues to subject i’s cumulative
cash earnings from all prior trading periods. This dollar amount is paid at the completion of the
session. The timing of events in our experimental design is summarized below:

t dividends paid;
francs=Dkit + y
i
t ,
assets=kit.
3-minute trading period
using a double auction
to trade assets and francs.
consumption takes place:
sit = Dk
i
t + y
i
t
+
X
j
Pt,j

kit,j − kit,j−1
Ð
.
die roll:
continue
to t + 1
w.p. 5/6,
else end.
t + 1
In this timeline, j indexes the transaction completed by subject i in period t. Pt,j is the price governing
the jth transaction for i in t. kit,j is the number of shares held by i after her j
th transaction in period
t. In the “autarkic” case where a subject does not transact, sit = Dk
i
t+y
i
t. In equilibrium, prices faced
by all subjects within a period are identical. Under the double auction mechanism, however, they can
diﬀer within and across periods and subjects.
29Copies of the instructions and materials are available at http://www.socsci.uci.edu/∼duffy/assetpricing/.
30Subjects earned an average of $7.22 for the subsequent Holt-Laury experiment and this amount was added to subjects’
total from the asset pricing experiment.
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3.5 Subject risk preferences
Following completion of the last sequence of trading periods, beginning with Session 7 we invite
subjects to participate in a further brief experiment involving a single play of the Holt-Laury (2002)
paired-lottery choice instrument. This task is commonly used to measure individual risk attitudes,
and we collected this data in order to test Hypothesis 5. After the market experiment, subjects
are informed that, if they are willing, they can participate in a second experiment that will last
an additional 10-15 minutes for which they can earn an additional monetary payment from the set¶
$0.30, $4.80, $6.00, $11.55
©
.31 All subjects agreed to participate in this second experiment. The
online appendix includes the instructions for the Holt-Laury task.32
3.6 Experimental Sessions
We conduct 20 sessions of our market experiment.33 Each session involves 12 subjects with no prior
experience in this design (240 subjects total). The treatments used are summarized in Table 2.
Session ui(si) D Holt-Laury test Session ui(si) D Holt-Laury test
1 Concave 2 No 11 Concave 3 Yes
2 Concave 3 No 12 Linear 3 Yes
3 Linear 2 No 13 Linear 3 Yes
4 Linear 3 No 14 Concave 3 Yes
5 Linear 2 No 15 Concave 2 Yes
6 Concave 2 No 16 Linear 2 Yes
7 Linear 3 Yes 17 Concave 3 Yes
8 Concave 3 Yes 18 Linear 3 Yes
9 Concave 2 Yes 19 Concave 2 Yes
10 Linear 2 Yes 20 Linear 2 Yes
Table 2: Assignment of Sessions to Treatment
We began to administer the Holt-Laury task following completion of the asset pricing experiment in
sessions 7 through 20, after it became apparent to us that it might help us to explain the substantial
variation in individual behavior that we observed in the linear treatments. Thus, in 14 of our 20
sessions, we have Holt-Laury measures of individual subject’s tolerance for risk (168 of our 240 subjects,
or 70%).
31These payoﬀ amounts are three times those oﬀered by Holt and Laury (2002) in their “low-payoﬀ” treatment. We
scale up the possible payoﬀs to make the amounts comparable to the steady state earnings over an average sequence of
trading periods.
32The Java script used to carry out the Holt-Laury test may be found at
http://www.socsci.uci.edu/∼duffy/assetpricing/.
33We also conduct a follow-up individual choice experiment, as described in Section 5.
20
4 Experimental findings
We begin by reporting a couple of ﬁndings regarding trading volume and market eﬃciency. First,
trading volume is similar across treatments, with mean volume per period around 25 shares in C3 and
23 shares in the other three treatments (the Wilcoxon two-tailed p-value is .529 for pooled linear vs.
concave treatments, .222 for C3 vs. C2, and .691 for C3 vs. L3).34 Second, mean (median) allocative
eﬃciency—earnings as a fraction of the maximum expected payoﬀ at the fundamental price—is 0.73
(0.80) for the concave treatment economies with no diﬀerence by dividend payment, while the linear
treatment economies are fully eﬃcient by construction. In the next two subsections we report ﬁndings
related to economies with concave or linear induced utility
4.1 Findings for induced concave utility
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, we have:
Finding 1. In the concave utility treatment (ηi < 1), observed transaction prices at the end of the
session are less than or equal to P∗ in 9 of 10 sessions.
To depict this visually, Figure 1 displays median transaction prices by period for the concave
sessions, D = 2 in Panel A and D = 3 in Panel B. Solid dots represent the ﬁrst period of a new
indeﬁnite trading sequence. To facilitate comparisons across sessions, prices are transformed into
percentage deviations from the fundamental price P∗. For example, a price of -40% in Panel A, where
D = 2, reﬂects a price of 6, whereas a price of -40% in Panel B, where D = 3, reﬂects a price of 9.
Figure 1: Equilibrium-normalized Prices, Concave Sessions
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(a) Concave D = 2
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(b) Concave D = 3
Of the ten concave utility sessions depicted in Panels A and B of Figure 1, half end relatively close
to the asset’s fundamental price, with a deviation from this price between -15% and 7%. The other
34There is considerably more between-session variation in trading volume in the linear sessions; the standard deviation
of volume between linear sessions is 8.0 shares, vs. 2.9 shares in the concave sessions.
21
half end well below it, with a deviation between -30% and -60%. Several sessions do experience upward
pressure on prices above the fundamental price (most notably, sessions 8 and 9), but these “bubbles”
are self-correcting by the end of the session.35 Importantly, these corrections are wholly endogenous,
rather than being triggered by a known ﬁnite horizon as in SSW. We emphasize that, while prices
in the concave treatment lie at or below P∗, subjects are never informed of this fundamental trading
price, as is done in some of the SSW-type asset market experiments.
A main implication of consumption-based asset pricing models, as conjectured in Hypothesis 3, is
addressed in the next ﬁnding.
Finding 2. In the concave utility treatments, there is strong evidence that subjects use the asset to
intertemporally smooth their consumption.
Figure 2: Per Capita Consumption-Smoothing
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Figure 2 depicts the per capita shareholdings of type 1 subjects by period (per capita shares of type
35Formal evidence supporting this statement is presented in the discussion related to Finding 3.
22
2 subjects is ﬁve minus this number). Dashed vertical lines denote the ﬁnal period of a sequence,36 and
dashed horizontal lines mark fundamental price equilibrium shareholdings (the bottom line for odd
periods of a sequence, and the top line for even periods). Recall that equilibrium shareholdings are
cyclic, increasing in high income periods and decreasing in low income periods. As Figure 2 indicates,
this pattern is precisely what occurred in each and every period on a per capita basis.37
Pooling across all concave sessions, on average type 1 subjects (on net) buy 1.94 shares in odd
periods (when they have a large endowment of francs) and sell 1.75 shares in even periods (when
they have a small endowment). By contrast, in the linear sessions subjects buy only 0.53 mean
shares in odd periods and sell 0.25 shares in even periods. Thus, while there is a modest degree of
consumption-smoothing in the linear sessions, consumption-smoothing is nearly four times as large in
the concave sessions. This indicates that consumption-smoothing observed in Figure 2 is attributed
to the concavity of the induced utility function ui, and not to the cyclic income process alone.
Figure 3: Individual Consumption-Smoothing
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Consumption-smoothing in the concave induced utility sessions is prevalent across individuals.
Figure 3 presents the cumulative distribution, across subjects, of the proportion of periods in which a
subject actively smoothes consumption, pooled by induced utility. Half of the subjects in the concave
sessions strictly smooth consumption in more than 80% of all trading periods, while less than 2% of
subjects in the linear sessions smooth consumption so frequently. Well over 90% of the subjects in
the concave sessions smooth consumption in at least half of the periods, whereas only 35% of subjects
in the linear sessions smooth consumption so frequently. The diﬀerence between these distributions
is signiﬁcant to many digits using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Note that the comparative absence of
36Thus, there are two allocations associated with each vertical line (except the ﬁnal line): One for the ﬁnal allocation
of the sequence, and the other for the re-initialized share endowment of the following sequence (always one unit).
37In this ﬁgure, the period numbers shown are aggregated over all sequences played. From a subject’s perspective,
each sequence starts with period 1.
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consumption-smoothing in the linear sessions is not indicative of anti-consumption smoothing behav-
ior. Rather, it results from the fact that many subjects in the linear treatment do not actively trade
any shares in many periods.
Previous experimental evidence on whether subjects can learn to smooth consumption in an opti-
mal manner without tradeable assets has not been encouraging. By contrast, in our simpler setting,
where subjects must engage in trade in the asset in order to smooth consumption, and can observe
the transaction prices for that asset in real time, we ﬁnd strong evidence for consumption-smoothing
behavior.
4.2 Findings for induced linear utility
Finding 3. Transaction prices in the linear utility sessions are signiﬁcantly higher than transaction
prices in the concave utility sessions.
Figure 4 displays median transaction prices by period for the linear sessions, D = 2 in Panel A
and D = 3 in Panel B. As in Figure 1, solid dots represent the ﬁrst period of a new indeﬁnite trading
sequence, and prices are transformed into percentage deviations from the fundamental price.
Figure 4: Equilibrium-normalized Prices, Linear Sessions
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(a) Linear D = 2
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(b) Linear D = 3
Table 3 displays median transaction prices over several frequencies by session, as well as an average
of these median prices by treatment (ﬁrst row, boldface type). Notice that for a given dividend value
D = 2 or 3, inconsistent with Hypothesis 1 but consistent with the alternative Hypothesis 2, the
average treatment price at each frequency is higher in the induced linear utility treatment than in
the corresponding induced concave utility treatment. Further, Table 3 reveals the price diﬀerence
between linear and concave treatments involving the same value of D generally diverges over time:
The mean treatment price is monotonically increasing in the linear treatments and decreasing in the
concave treatments. These trends at the session level can be identiﬁed using the Mann-Kendall τ
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Median First Pd Final Half Final 5 Pds Final Pd τ p-value
C2-Mean 9.6 10.9 9.4 9.0 8.3
S1 7 15 6 5 6 -0.67 0.0002
S6 9 10 9 9 10 0 1
S9 14 8.5 15 14 10 0.02 0.9592
S15 7 8 7 7 7 -0.39 0.0132
S19 11 13 10 10 8.5 -0.80 < 0.0001
L2-Mean 14.2 13.0 15.0 15.0 15.6
S3 13 13 13 13 13 -0.32 0.0609
S5 10 10 10 10 11 -0.06 0.8248
S10 18 18 20 20 20 0.63 0.0027
S16 18 13 20 20 22 0.81 < 0.0001
S20 12 11 12 12 12 0.27 0.1946
C3-Mean 10.8 8.4 10.8 10.6 10.4
S2 7 7 7 7 8 0.15 0.5174
S8 15 9 17 17 16 0.70 0.0010
S11 10 10 8 7 6 -0.78 < 0.0001
S14 13 11 13 13 13 -0.13 0.5698
S17 9 5 9 9 9 0.28 0.1551
L3-Mean 13.8 9.4 15.0 15.4 16.0
S4 10 6 11 12 13 0.72 0.0002
S7 13 10.5 13 13 13 0.33 0.1282
S12 10 11.5 10 10 10 -0.46 0.0228
S13 16 7 17 16 17 0.41 0.0356
S18 20 12 24 26 27 0.95 < 0.0001
Table 3: Median Transaction Prices By Session and Treatment
statistic, a non-parametric measure of monotonic trend.38 The τ values and signiﬁcance levels are
reported in the last two columns of Table 3. Five of ten linear sessions have a signiﬁcantly positive
trends, while only one has a signiﬁcantly negative trend (p < .05). Four of ten concave sessions have
a signiﬁcantly negative trend, while only one has a signiﬁcantly positive trend (p < .05). Thus, of 11
signiﬁcant trends, 9 are diverging by treatment, increasing the price diﬀerence between concave and
linear sessions over time. We reject the null hypothesis that the sign of signiﬁcant trends is drawn
from the same binomial distribution in the two induced utility treatments (chi-squared test p-value
is .036). This evidence suggests that price diﬀerences between the concave and linear sessions would
likely have been greater if our experimental sessions had involved more periods of play. We thus look
for treatment diﬀerences in median prices during the ﬁnal period of each session, as such prices best
reﬂect learning and the long-term trends in these markets, and further, provide the nearest observation
to steady state convergence in the event that intrinsic (unobserved) utility is DARA (Proposition 4).
To begin our analysis of price diﬀerences by treatment, we ﬁrst note that, using a Wilcoxon sign-
38Here τ ∈ [−1, 1], where τ = −1 indicates a strictly monotonic negative trend, τ = 1 a strictly monotonic positive
trend, and τ = 0 implies no trend.
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rank test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that ﬁnal period prices in treatments C2, C3, and L3
are less than or equal to the fundamental price, P∗, which was 10, 15 and 15, respectively. However,
we can reject the null hypothesis that ﬁnal period prices in treatment L2 are less than or equal to the
fundamental price (p = .031).
Next, comparing induced utility treatments for a ﬁxed dividend level, the distribution of ﬁnal
period prices between L2 and C2 is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (Wilcoxon two-tailed p-value is 0.019) but
the distribution of ﬁnal period prices between L3 and C3 is not (p-value is 0.139). Nevertheless, mean
diﬀerences are quite large in both cases: Pooling data according to the two induced utility treatments
alone (for both dividend values) we ﬁnd that on average, the median ﬁnal-period price in the induced
linear sessions is 32% above the fundamental price, while in the induced concave sessions it is 24%
below the fundamental price.39 The associated pooled Wilcoxon p-value is 0.011, so we reject the
null hypothesis that equilibrium-normalized ﬁnal period prices in the pooled linear sessions are drawn
from the same distribution as the concave sessions. Thus, there is strong evidence that the diﬀerence
in induced utilities caused a strong impact on prices by the end of the session. Prices are considerably
greater than the fundamental value in the linear sessions, and considerably lower than the fundamental
value in the concave sessions.
Surprisingly, the treatment variation in the dividend value did not induce the predicted impact
on prices in the initial periods of our experiment, although it has some impact by the ﬁnal period, as
summarized in Finding 4 and the discussion below.
Finding 4. For a given induced utility function ui, by the ﬁnal period, mean prices are higher in
sessions with higher dividend payments, D.
Consistent with Hypothesis 4, Table 3 reveals that the mean of ﬁnal period prices across the ﬁve
sessions of C2 is 8.3, relative to 10.4 in C3. The mean ﬁnal price in L2 is 15.6 relative to a mean ﬁnal
price of 16 in L3. Thus, by the end of the experiment, prices indeed tended to be greater when D = 3
than when D = 2 (though smaller when normalized as a percentage change from the fundamental
price). However, this result is not statistically signiﬁcant.
We note that this result is initially reversed. As Table 3 reveals, the mean ﬁrst period price in C2
is 10.9 relative to 8.4 in C3, and the mean ﬁrst period price in L2 is 13.0 relative to 9.4 in L3. In fact,
normalizing prices to be expressed as a fraction of the fundamental price, every session in C2 (L2)
initializes at a higher normalized price than every session in C3 (L3), which is statistically signiﬁcant.
This diﬀerence in initial conditions may be a consequence of higher (lower) franc balances relative to
the fundamental value of the asset in the low (high) dividend treatments40 or it could simply take
39We justify pooling by the two induced utility treatments because the distributions of ﬁnal period prices in C2 vs. C3
and L2 vs. L3 are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other at the 5% level (p-values of 0.172 and 0.094, respectively).
40The total value of the ﬁxed stock of 30 shares at the fundamental price when D = 3 is 30×15 = 450 francs per period
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Figure 5: Distribution (by Treatment) of Mean Shareholdings During the Final Two Periods
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some time for subjects to develop an appreciation for the relationship between the dividend and asset
values.
Thus, dividend has an unexpectedly negative (though relatively small) impact on prices in the
ﬁrst period, when the induced utility function ui appears to have little impact on prices. However,
by the end of the session, mean (non-normalized) prices are higher for D = 3 than for D = 2, within
each induced utility condition. Therefore, by the end of the experiment, induced utility is the main
determinant of price diﬀerences, and on average, variation in the dividend level has the expected
comparative static impact.
Finding 5. In the linear induced utility treatment, the asset is “hoarded” by just a few subjects.
In the linear utility sessions, where there is no clear motivation to engage in trade in the asset,
markets are nevertheless active. Nearly half of the subjects ultimately sell all of their shares, and a
small number of subjects accumulate most of the shares. Figure 5 displays the cumulative distribution
of mean individual shareholdings during the ﬁnal two periods of the ﬁnal sequence of each session,
pooled according to the induced utility function. 41 We average across two periods to account for
consumption-smoothing. We focus on ﬁnal shareholdings because it can take several periods within a
sequence for a subject to achieve a targeted position due to the budget constraint. Forty-two percent
of subjects in the linear sessions hold an average of 0.5 shares or less during the ﬁnal two periods. By
contrast, just 8% of subjects in the concave sessions hold so few shares. At the other extreme, 17% of
(number of shares times the value of each share at the fundamental price), while the total value of the 30 shares when
D = 2 is 30 × 10 = 300 francs. The total quantity of francs available per period when D = 3 is 134× 6 + 30× 3 = 894
francs (income per subject pair times 6 pairs plus total shares times dividend), while the quantity when D = 2 is
134× 6 + 30× 2 = 864. So the value of shares as a percentage of total resources per period is about 50% when D = 3
but only 34% when D = 2. Caginalp, Porter, and Smith (1998), among others, report that increasing francs relative to
a ﬁxed total (fundamental) value increases asset prices in the SSW setting. Thus, it is possible than an analogous eﬀect
happens in our design, resulting in the initial miss-pricing.
41We use the ﬁnal sequence with a duration of at least two periods.
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subjects in the linear sessions average at least 6 shares during the ﬁnal two periods, while only 6% of
subjects in the concave sessions hold so many.
The inequality in the distribution of shareholdings can be measured by the Gini coeﬃcient, which
is equal to zero when each subject holds an identical quantity of shares and is equal to one when a
single subject owns all shares. Across all treatments, in autarky the Gini coeﬃcient is 0.3. This is
also the value of the Gini coeﬃcient over the ﬁnal two periods of the fundamental price equilibrium in
treatment C2. In C3, the Gini coeﬃcient is slightly lower (0.25). The mean Gini coeﬃcient for mean
shareholdings in the ﬁnal two periods of all concave sessions is 0.37, not so far from the equilibrium
values. By contrast, the Gini coeﬃcient in the pooled linear sessions is signiﬁcantly larger, at 0.64
(statistically signiﬁcant to many signiﬁcant digits). This diﬀerence reﬂects the “hoarding” of a large
number of shares by just a few subjects in the linear sessions, behavior that is absent in the concave
sessions.42
4.3 Findings for intrinsic risk preferences
Our hypotheses imply that, when subjects are intrinsically risk neutral, the observed price should be P∗
in all treatments. Further, when subjects are characterized by strict DARA intrinsic utility, observed
prices should converge to P∗ in all treatments. Finally, when subjects are characterized by CARA
intrinsic utility, observed prices should be less than P∗. Beginning with our seventh experimental
session, we ask subjects to participate in a second experiment involving the Holt and Laury (2002)
paired lottery choice risk elicitation task. This second experiment takes place after the conclusion of
the asset market experiment, and is not announced in advance to minimize any potential inﬂuence on
decisions in the asset market.
In this second experiment, which takes about 5 minutes to complete, subjects face a series of 10
choices between binary lotteries A and B. The payments of lottery A are $6 and $4.80, and those
of lottery B are $11.55 and $0.30. For each choice j ∈
¶
1, 2, ..10
©
, the probability of getting the
high payoﬀ in either lottery is 110j. One of the ten choices is selected at random, with the chosen
lottery played for payment. As detailed in Holt and Laury, a risk-neutral expected utility maximizer
should choose B—the high-variance lottery—6 times. We deﬁne a subject’s HL score as the number
of times the subject selects the riskier lottery B. HL scores lower (greater) than 6 indicate risk averse
(risk seeking) behavior. In our sessions, the mean HL score is 3.87 with a standard deviation of 1.81,
indicating moderate overall risk aversion; indeed, 83.3 percent of subjects are classiﬁed as risk averse,
10.1 percent as risk neutral and the remaining 6.6 percent as risk-seeking, a fairly typical distribution.
42Interestingly, exactly two of twelve subjects in each of the ten linear sessions hold an average of at least 6 shares of
the asset during the ﬁnal two trading periods. Recall that the aggregate endowment in all sessions is 30 shares. Thus,
the subjects in the right tail of the distribution in Figure 5 are divided up evenly across the ten linear sessions.
28
To compare behavior in linear versus concave induced utility treatments, we regress (using OLS)
a subject’s mean shareholdings during the ﬁnal two periods on the subject’s HL score, with session
ﬁxed eﬀects and robust standard errors clustered on session-level observations. In the linear case, the
estimated coeﬃcient on the HL score is 0.65 with p-value 0.0181 (Table B.1). Thus, a one standard
deviation increase in the HL score (equal to 1.8 additional high-variance choices) implies a subject is
expected to hold nearly 1.2 additional shares of the asset by the end of the session. This is a large
impact, as there are only 2.5 shares per capita in these economies.43 We further note that the median
HL score of the largest shareholder per linear session is 6, and the median HL score of the two largest
shareholders per session is 5. The mean HL score of these 14 subjects (7 sessions) is 5.125, relative to
a mean of 3.869 across all subjects.
On the other hand, in the concave case, the estimated coeﬃcient is -0.16 with (cluster-robust)
p-value 0.137 (Table B.3), a statistically insigniﬁcant and small impact. Thus, the HL score is a far
more useful predictor of ﬁnal shareholdings in the linear sessions. This result for linear induced utility
is consistent with Breaban and Noussair (2015), who report that subjects with higher HL scores tend
to hold more assets in a SSW-related experiment.
Finding 6. Risk-tolerant subjects tend to hold signiﬁcantly more shares of the asset in the linear
treatment sessions, but not in the concave treatment sessions.
Finally, we test Hypothesis 5, that sessions with higher HL scores trade at higher prices in both
the concave and linear treatments. We report the relation between the mean HL score and median
ﬁnal period price at the session level. What follows is robust to many other summary statistics for
the distribution of HL scores, such as the median, upper quartile, etc. Following Taylor (1987), we
use treatment as a blocking variable and calculate the weighted average Spearman’s Rho—a non-
parametric measure of correlation—across treatments, assuming that ρi and ρj are independent for
any pair of treatments i and j. Letting ni be the number of sessions in treatment i, the weighted
average ρ =
P
ρi(ni−1)P
(ni−1) = −0.12. The statistic ρ
»P
(ni − 1) = −0.3795 is a draw from a standard
normal distribution, with associated p-value of 0.7044. Thus, the null hypothesis of a signiﬁcant
relation between HL scores and price is rejected. Similarly, the test statistics are also quite small for
both the linear and concave treatments alone.
Finding 7. We do not identify a signiﬁcant statistical relation between mean HL score and ﬁnal period
median price at the session level.
43Since the distribution of HL scores within-session is endogenous, for additional robustness, we also regress each
subject’s share of the sum of HL scores within-session on her average ﬁnal shareholdings. The coeﬃcient is 39.81 with
p-value 0.0001 (Table B.2). Playing against the observed frequency of HL scores (across all sessions) for the other eleven
subjects in each session, a risk-neutral subject with an HL score of 6 is predicted to hold 0.74 shares more than a subject
with a score of 5, even larger than the prediction obtained using the raw score approach.
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Ex-post, this ﬁnding is not so surprising. Prices in the linear treatment sessions are typically
greater than the equilibrium price bounds identiﬁed in Section 2.3, and Hypothesis 5 is derived under
the assumption of equilibrium behavior. Further, concentrated asset holdings in the linear treatment
(Finding 5) weakens the likelihood that a central measure of HL scores correlates with prices. In
the concave treatment sessions, the strength of the induced preference parameters implies that the
diﬀerence between the optimal savings path and perfect consumption-smoothing (under which the
market mechanically clears when everyone smoothes) is relatively small for a wide range of prices.
Consider, for example, an intrinsically risk-neutral subject in treatment C3 who faces a constant price
of 6 (relative to a fundamental price of 15). By Equation (17), she should increase her savings by
about 10% per period. In this treatment, an intrinsically risk-averse subject should increase their
savings by less (or not at all). Thus, the salience of Hypothesis 5 is modest, as excess demand oﬀ the
equilibrium path is expected to be small.
As noted above, we conduct the Holt-Laury test only after the market experiment concludes, as
the market is the main focus of our study. However, this order of tasks may aﬀect outcomes in the
Holt-Laury risk elicitation. To rule this out, we regress individuals’ HL scores on treatment dummy
variables (‘linear’ or ‘D3’), and on the individuals’ earnings from the ﬁrst part of our experiment
(asset market). The OLS regression ﬁndings, with robust standard errors clustered on session-level
observations as reported in Table B.4, indicate that neither treatment variables nor subjects’ earnings
are statistically signiﬁcant factors in explaining HL scores across sessions. This is reassuring evidence
that the HL scores, elicited following the asset pricing part of the experiment, are not aﬀected by asset
market conditions or payoﬀ outcomes.
4.4 Discussion of high prices in the induced linear utility sessions
Market behavior for the induced concave utility treatment is consistent with our hypotheses: Final
prices are at or below P∗, there is widespread consumption-smoothing, and a higher dividend leads to
higher ﬁnal prices. By contrast, in the induced linear utility treatment, we observe ﬁnal prices that
are greater than P∗ in 7 out of 10 sessions, contradicting Hypothesis 1 but consistent with the bubble
prices reported by SSW (Hypothesis 2) that motivated our experiment. We brieﬂy consider several
rationalizations for these diﬀerences, before turning to an explicating experiment.
Risk-seeking behavior. Since more risk-tolerant subjects tend to hold more shares in the induced
linear utility sessions (Finding 6), a possible explanation for the high prices in that treatment is that
risk-seeking subjects drive prices above P∗. In total, we conduct seven induced linear utility sessions
for which we have HL scores. Three of these sessions have no risk-seeking subjects present, yet each
of these sessions end at a median price above P∗. One of the seven sessions has three risk-seeking
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subjects, yet the price in this session remains considerably lower than P∗ in every period of the session.
Of the remaining three sessions, with one risk-seeking subject each, two conclude at a median ﬁnal
period price above P∗, and one ends below. Of the two high-price sessions, in one of them the risk-
seeking subject ends the session with 3 shares, and averages holding 1.4 shares per period. In the
other, the risk-seeking subject ends the session holding 15 shares, and averages holding 7.8 shares per
period. Thus, we observe high prices being driven by a subject identiﬁed as risk-seeking in only 1
of 7 sessions. It would appear that risk-seeking preferences alone, as identiﬁed by the HL score, is
insuﬃcient to explain the high prices we observe in the linear induced utility sessions.
Probability weighting. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that, while making decisions, indi-
viduals tend to act as if they distort probabilities through a probability weighting function. Subsequent
studies (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Camerer and Ho (1994)) show that the median indi-
vidual tends to underweight high probabilities and overweight low probabilities. In our experiment,
such distortions would tend to lower prices rather than raise them, as the continuation (termination)
probability would tend to be perceived as less than (greater than) 5/6 (1/6). Other studies (e.g.,
Birnbaum and McIntosh (1996), Etchart (2009), and Kemel and Travers (2016)) have shown that
individuals tend to overweight the probabilities of low outcomes (low future prices) and underweight
the probabilities of high outcomes (high future prices). Again, such distortions (pessimism) would
tend to lower prices rather than raise them.
However, as emphasized by Gonzalez and Wu (1999), there is substantial heterogeneity in these
distortions. For simplicity, consider a subject i with both linear ui and Ui, but a probability weighting
function wi (π). Clearly, the subject should buy as many shares of the asset as possible for a constant
price less than Dw
i(π)
1−wi(π) , and sell for a constant price greater than
Dwi(π)
1−wi(π) . Thus, it only takes one
of twelve subjects with wi
Ä
5
6
ä
> 56 (i.e., subject i overweights π) to support prices greater than P
∗.
While we might expect some relation between subject i’s HL score and wi
Ä
5
6
ä
, this relation need not
be monotonic across subjects.
Speculative trading. If a subject believes prices will increase over time, a strategy of purchasing
shares in the current period and selling them in a future period may be rationalizable even if the
current price is greater than P∗. As previously mentioned in section 2.4, Scheinkman and Xiong
(2003) and Hong et al. (2006) develop models in which optimistic or overconﬁdent investors can push
equilibrium prices beyond fundamentals. As we did not elicit beliefs, we do not bring evidence to bear
on this hypothesis, but we do note Haruvy et al. (2007) provide evidence of overly optimistic beliefs
about prices in the standard SSW design.
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5 Eliminating trading uncertainty
Individuals in our market experiment face two sources of uncertainty: (i) about the horizon length
and (ii) about trading opportunities (i.e., prices and liquidity). To focus on the former, we conduct an
additional set of experimental sessions in which we eliminate trading uncertainty by allowing individual
subjects to buy and sell an unlimited number of shares of the asset at an exogenously ﬁxed price.44
We refer to this experiment as the individual choice experiment, and to the previous experiment as
the market choice experiment.
In this new individual choice experiment, we adhere to our market choice framework as closely
as possible. We again set π = 56 and assign all subjects the Type 1 endowments and 2-cycle income
process. 45 We induce the Type 1 utility functions, concave or linear u, from the market experiment
as one treatment variable. Each subject’s decisions have no spillover eﬀects onto other subjects, and
are restricted only by her own budget constraint. We ﬁxed the dividend on the asset to D = 2, so
the risk-neutral fundamental price of the asset in all of these individual choice sessions is P∗ = 10. A
second treatment variable is the ﬁxed price at which subjects can buy or sell the asset, P ∈ {7, 10, 13}.
Subjects with induced concave utility either face a price of 7 or 10 for the entire experiment, which
we refer to as treatments C2-7 and C2-10, respectively. Subjects with induced linear utility either
face a price of 10 or 13 for the entire experiment, which we refer to as treatments L2-10 and L2-
13.46 Both risk preferences and probability weighting may impact on behavior in this individual
choice experiment.47 However, there is no scope for speculation to play a role in the individual choice
experiment, as subjects face no uncertainty with respect to price or liquidity in these experiments.
In the individual choice sessions, subjects are asked to enter a desired quantity of shares in a text
box and choose whether to “Buy” or “Sell” that number of shares. Subjects who wish to maintain
their share position in the current period are instructed to enter “0” in the text entry box and click
either “Buy” or “Sell.” Thus, the eﬀort to hold a position was equal to the eﬀort to buy or sell shares.
Table 4 summarizes the treatments of this individual choice experiment, which involves six ex-
perimental sessions with 12 subjects per session split equally between two treatments. (72 subjects
in total).48 We have thus have 18 independent observations for each of the four individual choice
44We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this treatment.
45As prices are exogenous in our individual choice experiment, there is no longer any need to have two player types.
46Recall that mean prices in the concave market choice sessions average 24% below P
∗
, while mean prices in the linear
market choice experiments average 32% above P
∗
. The two non-fundamental price treatments, (prices of 7 in the concave
treatment (C2-7) or 13 in the linear treatment (L2-13) thus reﬂect the mean deviations we found in the market choice
experiment.
47Regarding the impact of probability weighting, consider a risk-neutral subject for whom wi (π = 5/6) = 7
8
. This
subject will value one unit of the asset at 14 francs when D = 2 (as opposed to the unweighted price of 10 francs). Thus,
when facing a ﬁxed price of 13 francs, this subject should optimally purchase as many shares as her budget constraint
allows.
48The subjects in these individual choice sessions are University of Pittsburgh undergraduates who did not previously
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Session u (s) D Prices (# Subjects)
17 Concave 2 7 (6) 10 (6)
18 Concave 2 7 (6) 10 (6)
19 Concave 2 7 (6) 10 (6)
17-19 Concave 2 7 (18) 10 (18)
20 Linear 2 10 (6) 13 (6)
21 Linear 2 10 (6) 13 (6)
22 Linear 2 10 (6) 13 (6)
20-22 Linear 2 10 (18) 13 (18)
Table 4: Individual choice sessions
treatments C2-7, C2-10, L2-10 and L2-13. At the end of these sessions, subjects are again asked to
complete a Holt-Laury risk preference elicitation.49
5.1 Consumption smoothing
We ﬁrst consider the proportion of periods that a subject buys (sells) shares in high (low) income
periods. The distributions of these proportions across subjects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (to many
signiﬁcant digits) between the pooled linear and concave individual choice treatments. The diﬀer-
ence in consumption-smoothing between the linear individual choice and linear market treatments is
insigniﬁcant (p-value 0.88), while the diﬀerence between the concave individual choice and concave
market treatments is signiﬁcant (p-value 0.001); subjects smooth consumption even more frequently
in the concave individual choice treatments. In fact, nearly half of subjects smooth their consumption
in every period.
The standard deviation of consumption relative to autarky across periods provides additional
evidence for strong consumption smoothing in the concave individual choice treatment.50 Pooling
subjects into linear and concave treatments, this statistic is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from autarky in
both cases, but in opposite directions. In fact, only 3 of 36 subjects have a standard deviation of
consumption greater than autarky in the concave treatments, while only 5 of 36 subjects have a
standard deviation of consumption less than autarky in the linear treatments.
Finding 8. The extent of consumption smoothing is signiﬁcantly greater in the concave individual
choice setting than in the concave market choice setting, which we attribute to the price certainty of
the individual choice setting. Eliminating price uncertainty has no eﬀect on the extent of consumption
smoothing in the linear utility setting, where it continues to be far less than in the concave treatment.
participate in any of our market choice experiments.
49The instructions we use in these sessions are reported in the Online Appendix.
50The means of these ratios are 1.58 and 1.33 in L2-10 and L2-13, and 0.52 and 0.57 in C2-10 and C2-7, respectively.
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5.2 Trading volume
In the concave individual choice treatment with a ﬁxed price of 10, (C2-10), the mean decision is to
sell 2 shares in even (low-income) periods and to buy 2.5 shares in odd (high-income) periods. In
the concave treatment with a ﬁxed price of 7, (C2-7), the mean decision in even periods is to sell 2.7
shares, and the mean decision in odd periods is to buy 3.4 shares. Perfect consumption smoothing
requires buying (selling) 3 shares in high (low) income periods of treatment C2-10 and 4 shares in
treatment C2-7. Thus, mean trading volume is within one share of perfect consumption-smoothing in
both treatments. Consistent with Equation (25), while the overwhelming tendency in both concave
treatments is to smooth consumption, the volume of trade is substantially larger when the price is
7 rather than 10. In both odd and even periods, the distribution of choices in C2-10 vs. C2-7 are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other, with Wilcoxon p-values less than 0.01.
Finding 9. Trading volume is signiﬁcantly larger with a ﬁxed price of 7 as compared with a ﬁxed price
of 10 in the concave treatments, with the mean extent of consumption smoothing between treatments
roughly constant.
In the linear sessions, u
i′(st+1)
ui′(st)
= 1. Given a constant price P, dividend D, and our maintained
assumption that β = 1, Equation (17) can be rearranged as U
i′(ζt+1)
Ui
′
(ζt)
= P
π(P+D)
. For an intrinsically
risk-averse subject facing P ≥ P∗ as in our treatments L2-10 and L2-13, this expression implies that
Ui
′
(ζt+1)
Ui
′
(ζt)
≥ 1, which is infeasible since short sales are not permitted (recall that ζt+1 = ζt + ct+1).
Therefore, such intrinsically risk-averse subjects should sell all of their shares in the ﬁrst possible
instance so as to maximize their current consumption. However, few of our subjects “cash out” as
predicted; in fact, only 5 of 33 subjects (15%) are even close to the prediction that a subject who is
strictly risk averse in L2-10 or weakly risk averse in L2-13 will sell all of her shares in the ﬁrst period
and hold no shares throughout the experiment.51 However, mean trading volume at the higher price
is nearly cut in half, from 3.9 shares per period when the price is 10 to just 1.7 shares when the price
is 13.52
Finding 10. In the linear treatments, mean trading volume is more than double for a price of 10
relative to a price of 13, comparative statics which are consistent with expected utility theory reasoning.
However, only a few subjects (15%) individually behave in a manner even loosely consistent with
“cashing out” as predicted by their HL score under expected utility theory.
51We conservatively deﬁne a “near cash out” criteria as: (1) Holding fewer than one share on average in the ﬁnal two
periods, (2) Ending at least one-third of all periods with zero shares, and (3) Holding less than two shares per period on
average throughout the session. Only 2 of 33 subjects actually held zero shares throughout the experiment as predicted.
52Nearly one-third of all trades involve more than 5 shares of the asset in L2-10, while just over 10% of trades involve
more than 3 shares in L2-13.
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5.3 Intrinsic risk aversion
To examine the relation between shareholdings and Holt-Laury scores, we consider mean shareholdings
during the ﬁnal two periods as we did in the market choice experiment. Recall that in the pooled
linear market choice experiments, 42% of subjects hold less than one share during the ﬁnal two periods,
while 16% hold at least 6 shares. By comparison in L2-13 (L2-10), 44% (17%) of subjects hold less
than one share during the ﬁnal two periods, while 11% (28%) hold six or more. Thus, at the high
price, subjects in the linear individual choice experiment are far more likely to cash out and less likely
to hold a large number of shares.
Consistent with the market choice experiment, the relation between HL score and ﬁnal sharehold-
ings in both concave individual choice treatments is insigniﬁcant according to an OLS regression. Also
consistent with the market choice experiment, in the linear individual choice treatment, the impact of
HL score on ﬁnal shareholdings in treatment L2-10 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.53 However,
in the linear individual choice treatment L2-13, the relation between HL score and ﬁnal sharehold-
ings is statistically insigniﬁcant; in fact, the estimated coeﬃcient is negative (see Table B.6). This
unexpected ﬁnding suggests a re-investigation of the market choice experiment data.
We partition the linear market choice sessions for which we have HL scores into those with an
average price in the ﬁnal two periods at least 30% greater than the fundamental value, and sessions
with a lower price.54 For the low-price group, the relation between HL score and ﬁnal shares is positive
but insigniﬁcant (the estimated coeﬃcient is 0.39 with p-value 0.1131), while for the high-price group
the relation is positive and signiﬁcant (the estimated coeﬃcient is 0.81 with p-value 0.0142). The
results are reported in Tables B.7 and B.8.55 Thus, HL scores are predictive of shareholdings for high
but not low prices in the linear market choice sessions, and for low but not high prices in the linear
individual choice sessions.
To develop some insight into what drives this diﬀerence, we consider shareholdings for three HL
score clusters (risk averse, approximately risk neutral, and risk seeking), subdivided into low- and
high-price sessions. Table 5 displays average ﬁnal shares. Subjects generally purchase fewer shares
under high prices except the risk-neutral group in a market choice setting, who on average purchase
far more shares. While there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the distribution of shareholdings for
the risk-neutral group versus other subjects when prices are low (Wilcoxon p-value 0.9901), in the
53The coeﬃcient on HL score is large, 0.93, with associated p-value of 0.0337. Full results are reported in Table B.5.
54This partition has several useful properties: (1) Thirty percent represents the high-price designation in the individual
choice experiment; (2) Thirty percent separates the market choice treatment sessions into two relatively equal-sized
groups; and (3) There is a distinct break in prices between the two groups; the low-price group concludes at prices of
-33%, -13%, 13%, and 20%, while the high-price group ﬁnishes at 80%, 100% and 115%.
55Adjusting for HL score heterogeneity between sessions by regressing a subject’s share of the total HL score within-
session on ﬁnal shareholdings conﬁrms this result. The slope coeﬃcient is 21 with a p-value of 0.124 in the low-price
case, while the coeﬃcient is 53 with a p-value of 0.0026 in the high-price case.
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market choice sessions there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence when prices are high (p-value 0.0022).
Final Shareholdings by HL Score
Treatment Price HL 1-4 HL 5-7 HL 8-10
Market Low 2.19 3.01 3.83
Market High 1.13 5.13 2.5
Choice Low 3.14 5.13 NaN
Choice High 2.07 2.17 NaN
Table 5: Mean Final Shares in Linear Individual Choice Sessions
Finding 11. The distribution of ﬁnal shareholdings in the individual choice sessions appears to be rel-
atively consistent with shareholdings in the market choice sessions for both concave and linear induced
utility. However, while subjects tend to hold fewer shares in the linear individual choice sessions when
the price is high, in the linear market choice sessions, subjects who are approximately risk neutral
according to the Holt-Laury elicitation substantially increase their shareholdings.
In the linear individual choice experiment, high prices cause subjects to purchase fewer shares.
However, in the linear market choice experiment one group of subjects increases its demand for shares
at far greater prices: the group of subjects identiﬁed as approximately risk neutral by the Holt-
Laury elicitation. Thus, speculation about the likelihood of future price increases may play a more
substantial role than risk-seeking behavior or probability weighting in causing the large price
bubbles we observe in the linear market choice experiment. But why are the approximately risk-
neutral subjects the ones who bid up assets prices? Here, we must ourselves become speculative, and
point to the existing literature for some possible clues.
De Martino et al. (2013) report an increased propensity to “ride” ﬁnancial bubbles in a SSW setting
for individuals whose economic value computations are aﬀected by social signals. Their interpretation
is that individuals who incorporate inferences about the intentions of others when making ﬁnancial
decisions are the most likely to bid asset prices above fundamentals, fueling a bubble. They stress
that these results “suggest that during ﬁnancial bubbles, participants’ choices are less driven by
explicit information available in the market (i.e., prices and fundamentals) and are more driven by
other computational processes, perhaps imagining the path of future prices and likely the behavior of
other traders” (p. 1223). That is, individuals with a strong theory of mind (ToM) suﬀer “enhanced
susceptibility to buying assets at prices exceeding their fundamental value” (p. 1223).
Ibanez et al. (2013) establish a strong relation between ﬂuid intelligence and ToM, while Benjamin
et al. (2013) establish a relation between cognitive ability and small-stakes risk neutrality. Assuming
that the associated correlations aggregate so that small-stakes risk neutrality is associated with higher
ToM, approximately risk-neutral subjects may bid up asset prices in our linear market choice exper-
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iment, but demand fewer shares in our individual choice experiment at high prices, because in the
individual choice experiment there are no intentions of “others” to predict, and thus no speculative
rewards.
6 Conclusion
The consumption-based asset pricing model is a workhorse framework that continues to be used in
macroeconomics and ﬁnance, despite weak empirical support using non-experimental ﬁeld data. In this
paper, we develop and test an implementation of the comparative static predictions of consumption-
based asset pricing models in the controlled conditions of the laboratory which allows for more careful
control over the environment and data measurement than is possible using ﬁeld data. Thus, one aim
of this paper is to provide a test of consumption-based asset pricing models under highly favorable
conditions, abstracting from noisy potential confounds. A second aim of this paper is to build a bridge
between the experimental asset pricing literature, which has typically followed the SSW experimental
design, and the consumption-based asset pricing models used in the macro ﬁnance literature.
We ﬁnd that the consumption-based asset pricing model performs well in some dimensions. In
particular, we ﬁnd strong evidence in our concave induced utility treatment that subjects use the
asset to intertemporally smooth their consumption by buying shares in high-income periods and
selling shares in low-income periods. Further, we ﬁnd that prices respond to changes in economic
fundamentals, e.g., to changes in the dividend the asset pays. Finally, we are able to rationalize the
prices we observe, mostly at or below the fundamental price, by accounting for subjects’ intrinsic
risk aversion. This latter ﬁnding is new to the literature and would be hard to obtain outside of the
laboratory.
For comparison purposes, we also implement a linear induced utility market treatment that is
closer to the SSW design in the sense that subjects are not exogenously motivated to use the asset
to smooth consumption or to engage in any trade whatsoever. In this treatment, we ﬁnd that asset
prices are considerably higher than in the comparable concave induced utility treatment. Six of our
ten linear utility economies experience sustained deviations above the fundamental price, and in ﬁve
of those sessions the “bubble” exhibits no sign of collapse. By contrast, when consumption-smoothing
is induced in an otherwise identical economy, as in our concave treatment, such price bubbles are less
frequent, of lower magnitude, and of shorter duration. Thus, one main take-away from our experiment
for macroeconomic and ﬁnance researchers is that concavity of the utility function is not only necessary
for consumption smoothing; it is also essential to prevent asset price bubbles from arising.
Indeed, in a follow-up individual choice experiment, we infer that speculation rather than risk-
seeking behavior or probability weighting is the most likely cause of bubbles in the linear market
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choice experiment. Subjects identiﬁed as approximately risk neutral according to the Holt-Laury
paired choice task are the primary buyers of assets during linear market bubbles, but these same
subjects buy comparatively fewer shares at a constant price above fundamentals in the individual
choice experiment, where speculation is not possible.
Our research can be extended in at least three distinct directions. First, the experimental design
can be moved a step closer to the environments used in the macroﬁnance literature by adding a
Markov process for dividends and/or a known, constant growth rate in endowment income. Such
treatments would allow for the exploration of the robustness of our present ﬁndings to stochastic
or growing environments. Further, the design could be extended to induce consumption-smoothing
through overlapping generations rather than cyclic income and concave induced utility.
Second, it could be useful to combine various elements of our design with the much-studied ex-
perimental design of Smith et al. (1988) to further explore reasons for the observed diﬀerences in
behavior under our design versus the design of SSW. For example, one could add a constant continu-
ation probability to the ﬁnite horizon, linear (induced) utility design of SSW. Would the interaction
of a ﬁnite horizon with random termination inhibit bubbles relative to the SSW design? Or is an
induced economic incentive to trade necessary to prevent a small group of speculators from eﬀectively
setting prices across a broad range of economies?
Finally, our approach suggests that heterogeneity in individual characteristics, namely preferences
for risk as identiﬁed by the paired choice lottery task, plays a role in the determination of asset prices,
particularly in the extent of the departures of asset prices from fundamentals. However, this impact
appears not to be driven by a mechanical application of expected utility theory, but rather a correlation
between proximity to risk neutrality and the likelihood to engage in speculative activity. Theoretical
work which pairs risk attitudes with belief distributions that support speculative behavior may prove
useful to explain the mechanics of asset price bubbles.
We leave these extensions and additional experimental designs to future research.
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Appendices
A Proofs
Lemma 1. The equilibrium solution to the maximization problem, deﬁned in Equation (12), satisﬁes
vi′
Ä
mit
ä
= (1− π)Ui′
Ä
ζit
ä
ui′
Ä
sit
ä
. (26)
Proof. Drop the superscript i and write s∗t as a function s∗t (mt) of mt, such that the solution s∗t
depends on mt. That is, s∗t (mt) is a function that solves the maximization problem in Equation (12)
for any given mt. Deﬁne the function
f (mt, s∗t (mt)) = (1− π)U (ζt) + πβEt [v (mt+1)] . (27)
By the Envelope Theorem (e.g., Milgrom and Segal (2002)), the total derivative of f is
df
dmt
=
∂f
∂mt
+
∂f
∂st
ds∗t
dmt
. (28)
Since kt+1 can be written kt+1 = 1Pt (mt + yt − st),
mt+1 =
Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt
(mt + yt − st) . (29)
Thus,
∂f
∂mt
= πβEt
ï
v′ (mt+1)
Pt+1 + Dt+1
Pt
ò
. (30)
Diﬀerentiating f with respect to st gives
∂f
∂st
= (1− π)U′ (ζt) u′ (st)− πβEt
ï
v′ (mt+1)
Pt−1 + Dt+1
Pt
ò
. (31)
By the ﬁrst order condition in Equation (15), this expression is equal to zero. Thus, since dfdmt = v
′ (mt),
by Equations (28) and (30),
v′ (mt) = πβEt
ï
v′ (mt+1)
Pt+1 + Dt+1
Pt
ò
. (32)
Now, by the FOC in Equation (15),
πβEt
ï
v′ (mt+1)
Pt+1 + Dt+1
Pt
ò
= (1− π)U′ (ζt) u′ (st) . (33)
Therefore,
v′ (mt) = (1− π)U′ (ζt) u′ (st) .
Proof of Proposition 1. Since intrinsic utility Ui is linear, by Equation (17), in equilibrium
ui ′

sit+1
Ð
ui′

sit
Ð = uj
′ Ä
sjt+1
ä
uj ′
Ä
sjt
ä , (34)
for every time t and every pair of consumers i and j. When the induced utility, ui, is linear,
ui
′(sit+1)
ui′(sit)
= 1
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for each consumer i in every time t, regardless of the savings. When the induced utility ui is strictly
concave, suppose that there exists an equilibrium allocation such that sit < sit+1 for some i. Since
aggregate resources are ﬁxed, there must be some consumer j for whom sjt > s
i
t+1. But, since u
i is
strictly concave, then
ui ′

sit+1
Ð
ui′

sit
Ð < uj
′ Ä
sjt+1
ä
uj ′
Ä
sjt
ä , (35)
which violates Equation (17). Thus, sit = s
i
t+1 and
ui
′(sit+1)
ui ′(sit)
= 1 for every consumer i. That is, in both
cases, when ui is either linear or concave,
ui
′(sit+1)
ui′(sit)
= 1. Therefore, Equation (18) can be simpliﬁed to
P∗t = D
∞X
t=1
πt. Since π < 1, this geometric sum simpliﬁes to P∗t =
πD
1−π for all t.
Concerning the second part of the proposition, since ui is strictly concave, equilibrium savings are
constant over time for every consumer i, which deﬁnes a unique savings level sit = s
i
t+1 = s
i∗ for each
consumer i.
Proof of Proposition 2. By Equation (17), in equilibrium,
Ui ′

ζit+1
Ð
Ui′

ζit
Ð ui
′ 
sit+1
Ð
ui′

sit
Ð = U
j ′ Äζjt+1ä
Uj ′
Ä
ζjt
ä uj
′ Ä
sjt+1
ä
uj ′
Ä
sjt
ä (36)
for all consumers i, j and t > 0. Since ζit+1 = ζ
i
t + cit+1 > ζ
i
t (i.e., interiority is assumed and no
borrowing is allowed) and Ui is strictly concave by assumption, then
Ui
′(ζit+1)
Ui
′(ζit)
< 1 for every consumer
i. Suppose that
Ui
′(ζit+1)
Ui
′(ζit)
ui
′(sit+1)
ui′(sit)
≥ 1. Then u
i′(sit+1)
ui′(sit)
> 1, and thus sit+1 < s
i
t for all i. Such an
allocation, however, is not feasible since total resources are ﬁxed. Thus,
Ui
′(ζit+1)
Ui
′(ζit)
ui
′(sit+1)
ui′(sit)
< 1 for all i
and t. The sum in Equation (18) is then less than P∗, for which U
i′(ζit+1)
Ui
′(ζit)
ui
′(sit+1)
ui′(sit)
= 1 for every t.
Proof of Proposition 3. In equilibrium, Equation (17) must be satisﬁed for all consumers at every
period t. Thus,
−γicit+1 + ln
"
ui′

sit+1
Ð
ui′

sit
Ð
#
= −γjcjt+1 + ln
2
4 uj ′
Ä
sjt+1
ä
uj ′
Ä
sjt
ä
3
5 (37)
for all i, j. Let si∗ be consumer i’s saving in steady state. First, to show that there exists a unique
feasible allocation such that sit = s
i
t+1 = s
i∗ for each i and Equation (37) is satisﬁed for every pair of
consumers i and j, suppose to the contrary that there exists an allocation such that sit = s
i
t+1 > s
i∗
for some i. Since resources are ﬁxed, then there exists sjt = s
j
t+1 < s
j∗ for some consumer j. Since cit+1
is increasing in sit+1 and by construction ln
ï
ui
′(sit+1)
ui′(sit)
ò
= 0, then γicit+1 > γ
iui

si∗t+1
Ð
= γjuj
Ä
sj∗t+1
ä
>
γjcjt+1, a violation of Equation (37). Therefore, s
i∗ is unique for each consumer i.
When ui is linear, ln
ï
ui
′(sit+1)
ui′(sit)
ò
= 0 for any sit and sit+1, which completes the proof for this case.
Assume now that ui is strictly concave. Let Zt+1 be the equilibrium value of Equation (37) at time t.
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That is,
Zt+1 ≡ −γiui
Ä
sit+1
ä
+ ln
"
ui′

sit+1
Ð
ui′

sit
Ð
#
, (38)
for every consumer i and j. In a steady state equilibrium, Zt+1 = −γiui

si∗t+1
Ð
, denoted Z∗. Suppose
at time t a nonempty set of consumers It =
ý
i : sit > s
i∗. Then, by Equation (37), there exists a
nonempty set of consumers Jt =
¶
j : sjt < s
j∗©. Let Ht = ¶h : sht = sh∗©, which may be empty. To
prove convergence, it is suﬃcient to show that
P
	∈L
þþþs	t+1 − s	∗
þþþ< P
	∈L
þþþs	t − s	∗
þþþ, where L = H ∪ I ∪ J is
the set of all consumers.
First, suppose that Zt+1 = Z∗. Since ui is strictly increasing and strictly concave, sit > sit+1 > si∗
for any i ∈ It, and sjt < sjt+1 < sj∗ for any j ∈ Jt; otherwise Equation (37) does not hold. Further,
sht+1 = s
h
t = s
h∗ for h ∈ Ht. Thus, P
	∈L
þþþs	t+1 − s	∗
þþþ< P
	∈L
þþþs	t − s	∗
þþþ.
Next, suppose Zt+1 > Z∗. Equation (37) then implies that s
j
t+1 < s
j∗ for all j ∈ Jt, sht+1 < sh∗ for
all h ∈ Ht, and sit+1 < sit for all i ∈ It. Split It into At =
ý
i : i ∈ It, sit+1 ≤ si∗

, which may be empty,
and Bt =
ý
i : i ∈ It, si∗ < sit+1 < sit

.56 Since total resources are ﬁxed,
P
i∈It
þþþsit − si∗
þþþ= P
j∈Jt
þþþsjt − sj∗
þþþ,
and since in addition sjt+1 < s
j∗ for all j ∈ At ∪Ht∪Jt, then P
i∈Bt
þþþsit+1 − si∗
þþþ= P
j∈At∪Ht∪Jt
þþþsjt+1 − sj∗
þþþ.
But, by the deﬁnition of Bt,
P
i∈Bt
þþþsit+1 − si∗
þþþ < P
i∈It
þþþsit − si∗
þþþ. Thus, P
	∈L
þþþs	t+1 − s	∗
þþþ < P
	∈L
þþþs	t − s	∗
þþþ.
Since this holds for any t, lim
t→∞
P
	∈L
þþþs	t − s	∗
þþþ= 0. Therefore, lim
t→∞ s
	
t = s
	∗, for every consumer . The
proof for Zt+1 < Z∗ is similar.
Proof of Proposition 4. When Ui is DARA, as t → ∞, Ui tends to a linear form. Then, by
Proposition 1, price converges to P∗, and if ui is strictly concave, savings satisfy sit = sit+1 = si∗.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let i = {1, 2} denote the two types of consumers. By Equation (17),Ç
c11
c11 + c
1
2
åγ Ç
s11
s12
åδ
=
Ç
c21
c21 + c
2
2
åγ Ç
s21
s22
åδ
. (39)
By Walras’ Law, let s1t = S¯xt and s2t = S¯ (1− xt), where xt ∈ (0, 1), and S¯ is the total possible
savings. Then, substitution this using cit =
(sit)
1−δ
1−δ into Equation (39), providesÇ
x1−δ1
x1−δ1 + x
1−δ
2
åγ Å
x1
x2
ãδ
=
 
(1− x1)1−δ
(1− x1)1−δ + (1− x2)1−δ
! γ Å1− x1
1− x2
ãδ
. (40)
Since the left hand side of Equation (39) decreases in x2 and the right hand side increases in x2, the
solution x1 = x2 is unique. Thus, Ç
c11
c11 + c
1
2
åγ Ç
s11
s12
åδ
=
Å1
2
ãγ
. (41)
Similarly, in the following period,Ç
c11 + c
1
2
c11 + c
1
2 + c
1
3
åγ Ç
s12
s13
åδ
=
Å2
3
ãγ
, (42)
56Note that j ∈ Ht ∪ Jt implies j ∈ Jt+1, while i ∈ It can be a member of It+1, Jt+1, or Ht+1.
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and so on, such that in period tÇ
ζ1t
ζ1t + c1t+1
åγ Ç
s1t
s1t+1
åδ
=
Å
t
t+ 1
ãγ
. (43)
The result then follows by substituting this sequence into Equation (18).
Proof of Corollary 1. Immediately obtained by Equation (23).
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B Regression Results
Table B.1: OLS Regression of Final Shares on HL Scores with Session Fixed Eﬀects, Linear
Treatments (Clustered Standard Errors)
si = β0 + β1hi+ (session dummies) +εi
si = average shares of subject i during the ﬁnal 2 periods of the (linear) session
hi = HL score of subject i in the (linear) session
Coeﬃcient Standard Error z P > |z| [95% Conﬁdence Interval]
β1 0.6496689 0.1894655 3.43 0.014 [.1860635, 1.113274]
β2 (S7) -1.245199 .3631422 -3.43 0.014 [-2.133776, -.3566218]
β3 (S10) -1.245199 .3631422 -3.43 0.014 [-2.133776, -.3566218]
β4 (S12) -.9203642 .2684094 -3.43 0.014 [-1.577138, -.26359]
β5 (S16) -.6496689 .1894655 -3.43 0.014 [-1.113274, -.1860635]
β6 (S18) -.1082781 .0315776 -3.43 0.014 [-.1855457, -.0310106]
β7 (S20) -.1624172 .0473664 -3.43 0.014 [-.2783186, -.0465159]
β0 (S13) .4427152 .599974 0.74 0.488 [-1.025368, 1.910799]
R-squared: 0.1072, Root MSE: 3.412
Table B.2: OLS Regression of Final Shares on HL Score Shares, Linear
si = β0 + β1hi + εi
si = average shares of subject i during the ﬁnal 2 periods of the (linear) session
hi = HL score of subject i divided by the sum of HL scores within the session
Coeﬃcient Standard Error z P > |z| [95% Conﬁdence Interval]
β1 39.8056 9.7839 4.068 0.000108
β0 -0.8611 0.8957 -0.961 0.339147
Residual standard error: 3.171 on 82 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.168, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1578
F-statistic: 16.55 on 1 and 82 DF, p-value: 0.0001082
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Table B.3: OLS Regression of Final Shares on HL Scores, Concave (Clustered Standard
Errors)
si = β0 + β1hi + εi
si = average shares of subject i during the ﬁnal 2 periods of the (concave) session
hi = HL score of subject i in the (concave) session
Coeﬃcient Standard Error z P > |z| [95% Conﬁdence Interval]
β1 -.1603221 .0925407 -1.73 0.134 [-.3867609, .0661167]
β2 (S8) -.1736823 .1002524 -1.73 0.134 [ -.418991, .0716264]
β3 (S9) -.0801611 .0462703 -1.73 0.134 [-.1933805, .0330584]
β4 (S14) -.0935212 .053982 -1.73 0.134 [-.2256105, .0385681]
β5 (S15) -.1202416 .0694055 -1.73 0.134 [-.2900707, .0495875]
β6 (S17) -.0534407 .0308469 -1.73 0.134 [-.1289203, .0220389]
β7 (S19) -.0935212 .053982 -1.73 0.134 [-.2256105, .0385681]
β0 (S11) 3.168009 .3855861 8.22 0.000 [2.224514, 4.111504]
R-squared: 0.0198, Root MSE: 1.9522
Table B.4: Linear Regression of HL Score on Treatment Dummies and Earnings
hi = β0 + β1Linear + β2D3 + β3Payi + 	i
hi = subject i’s Holt Laury score
Linear: linear treatment dummy
D3: d = 3 treatment dummy
Payi = subject i’s earnings
OLS Regression Number of obs = 168
R2 (overall): 0.0187 Wald χ2(3) = 2.91
corr(ui,X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > χ
2=0.4929
hi Coef. Std. Error t P > |t| [95% Conﬁdence Interval]
β1 0.4600691 0.3574489 1.29 0.198 [-0.2405178, 1.160656]
β2 -0.0141679 0.3217259 -0.04 0.965 [-0.6447392, 0.6164033]
β3 0.0139502 0.0277779 0.50 0.616 [-0.0404934, 0.0683939]
β0 3.430148 0.4083777 8.40 0.000 [2.629742, 4.230554]
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Table B.5: OLS Regression of Final Shares on HL Scores, L2-10 Choice
si = β0 + β1hi + εi
si = average shares of subject i during the ﬁnal 2 periods of the session
hi = HL score of subject i in the session
Coeﬃcient Standard Error z P > |z|
β1 0.9306 0.4006 2.323 0.0337
β0 0.1713 1.5745 0.109 0.9147
Residual standard error: 2.404 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.2522, Adjusted R-squared: 0.2054
F-statistic: 5.395 on 1 and 16 DF, p-value: 0.0337
Table B.6: OLS Regression of Final Shares on HL Scores, L2-13 Choice
si = β0 + β1hi + εi
si = average shares of subject i during the ﬁnal 2 periods of the session
hi = HL score of subject i in the session
Coeﬃcient Standard Error z P > |z|
β1 -0.1923 0.6911 -0.278 0.784
β0 2.8526 2.8863 0.988 0.338
Residual standard error: 3.524 on 16 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.004817, Adjusted R-squared: -0.05738
F-statistic: 0.07744 on 1 and 16 DF, p-value: 0.7844
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Table B.7: OLS Regression of Final Shares on HL Scores, Linear Market Low Price
si = β0 + β1hi + εi
si = average shares of subject i during the ﬁnal 2 periods of the session
hi = HL score of subject i in the session
Coeﬃcient Standard Error z P > |z|
β1 0.3942 0.2440 1.615 0.113
β0 0.8987 1.1053 0.813 0.420
Residual standard error: 3.388 on 46 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.05369, Adjusted R-squared: 0.03311
F-statistic: 2.61 on 1 and 46 DF, p-value: 0.1131
Table B.8: OLS Regression of Final Shares on HL Scores, Linear Market High Price
si = β0 + β1hi + εi
si = average shares of subject i during the ﬁnal 2 periods of the session
hi = HL score of subject i in the session
Coeﬃcient Standard Error z P > |z|
β1 0.8129 0.3145 2.585 0.0142
β0 -0.9097 1.4266 -0.638 0.5280
Residual standard error: 3.262 on 34 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.1643, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1397
F-statistic: 6.683 on 1 and 34 DF, p-value: 0.0142
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